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The Louisiana Legislation of 1938
PAUL

M.

HEBERT* AND CARLOS

E.

LAZARUSj-

It is intended in this article to present a brief review of a portion of the work of the Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature for the year 1938. The session closed in July after producing
a total of 431 acts, including 28 proposed constitutional amendments. Of the 403 statutes having the effect of law, all measures
received executive approval except one statute that was allowed
to become law by limitation.' In addition, 18 measures which
2
passed both houses were vetoed by the Governor.
Perhaps the most noteworthy proposal rejected by the Legislature was that for the adoption of a Mineral Code for Louisiana.8
Widespread interest had been created in the Proposed Mineral
Code, but after rejecting the Code the Legislature also refused to
approve a substitute measure that would have allowed the Coin* Dean and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Counsel to the
Legislative Bureau, 1932-1938.
t Research Assistant, Louisiana State University School of Law, LL.B.
1937, Loyola University (New Orleans).
1. Act 430 of 1938 allowing divorce when parties have been living separate
and apart for two years became law without the Governor's signature by
virtue of his failure to approve or veto it within the ten days allowed by
La. Const. of 1921, Art. V, § 15.
2. House Bills Nos. 4, 71, 122, 244, 248, 268, 324, 459, 460, 490, 572, 678 and
Senate Bills Nos. 63, 104, 168, 184, 221, 239. Indication of the objects of these
bills may be found in Official Calendar of the House of Representatives (1938)
and Official Calendar of the Senate (1938). Four of the bills passed were
vetoed July 7, 1938, and recalled the same day and approved, becoming Acts
426, 427, 428 and 429. Baton Rouge State-Times July 8, 1938, p. 5. This might
raise the question of the Chief Executive's power to recall a veto. No case
has been found dealing with this point. The authorities are in conflict on
the power of the Legislature to recall a bill which has been duly passed and
presented to the Governor for his approval. See State ex rel Florida Portland
Cement Co. v. Hale, 176 So. 577 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1937) and cases cited therein.
In Anderson v. Atwood, 373 Mich. 316, 262 N.W. 922, 924 (1935) the court refers
to Instances in which the President of the United States had affixed his signature to a bill and after a request of Congress for the return of the bill,
he erased his signature and complied with the request. On the veto power in
Louisiana see La. Const. of 1921, Art. V, § 15. See also dictum in People ex rel
Partello v. McCullough, 210 Ill. 488, 71 N.E. 602, 605 (1904) to the effect that
when a bill is deposited with the Secretary of State the Governor's power
over it has ceased and an approved bill so deposited cannot be later recalled
and vetoed.
3. For a discussion of the Proposed Code of the Oil, Gas and Mineral
Laws of the State of Louisiana, prepared pursuant to Act 170 of 1936 and
Act No. 320 of 1936, a constitutional amendment adopted November 3, 1936, see
the series of addresses delivered before the 1938 meeting of the Louisiana
State Bar Association, held at Baton Rouge, April 22, 1938, published in 12
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mission two additional years in which to render a report.4 Judging from this action, it appears very doubtful whether or not the
measure can muster the support necessary for its passage in the
near future, despite the fact that attempts are already being made
to work out plans whereby it may be resubmitted in 1940. 5 Although the Code did not receive legislative approval, some of its
provisions found their way into law in the form of separate statutes and doubtless it is to be expected that other enactments based
on the Code will be separately and independently proposed in the
future should the Code in its entirety be rejected again.6
To members of the legal profession, the statute designating
the Louisiana State Law Institute as an official legal research
agency and law revision commission for the State of Louisiana is
Tulane L. Rev. 552-606 (1938). The Mineral Code was printed in pamphlet
form and distributed among a limited mailing list through the State. The
Code with the report of Mr. Sidney L. Herold, Chairman of the Code Commission, is printed in full in Official J1. of the Senate (1938) 60-86.
4. The legislative history of the Proposed Mineral Code is as follows:
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 10, by Messrs. Lindsey and Peltier provided for the appointment of a joint committee of two members from each
House with the Attorney General as Ex-officio Chairman to consider proposed amendments to the Code in accordance with the provisions of Act 320 of
1936. This resolution was first introduced in the Senate May 23, 1938, the rules
were suspended and the resolution was passed unanimously. On the same
legislative day the resolution was sent to the House of Representatives for
concurrence and the rules were immediately suspended on motion of Mr.
Morvant in order that the resolution might be considered. Although Mr.
Morvant later moved to have its consideration postponed, on motion of Mr.
Peters, the whole subject matter was tabled by a vote of 62 to 29. Official
Jl. of the H. of Reps. (1938) 170; Official J1. of the Senate (1938) 150. This
action made it impossible to comply with the constitutional provision (Act
320 of 1936) relative to the method of amendment. Senate Bill No. 106 by
Messrs. Peltier and Lindsey proposing the adoption of the Mineral Code was
first introduced in the Senate on May 19, 1938 and was referred to Judiciary
Committee, Section A. On June 23rd the bill was reported out with amendments which substituted an entirely new measure in the form of a proposed
constitutional amendment which would extend the time for the report of the
Code Commission to the next Regular Session in 1940. This amended bill was
passed in the Senate on June 30, 1938; and although it received a favorable
vote in the House on July 6th of 58 to 7, it was a constitutional amendment
and failed for lack of a two-thirds vote of all the members elected to the
House. On the closing day of the session, July 7th, the bill was indefinitely
postponed and motion to reconsider was laid on the table by a vote of 52 to
22. It should also be noted that the proposed Code was submitted to both
houses by the Governor on May 16, 1938, 4th legislative day (Official J1. of H.
of R. (1938) 56; Official Jl. of the Senate (1938) 60) instead of on the first day
of the Regular Session as required by the constitutional amendment authorizing the Code (Act 320 of 1936). There was therefore question as to whether
or not the Code was legally before the Legislature.
5. A Mineral Code could be proposed and enacted like other statutes in
compliance with La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 24.
6. See La. Acts 96, 97 and 205 of 1938. Cf. Dreyfous, The Relation of the
Proposed Mineral Code to the Civil Code (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 604, at 606.
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of particular interest.7 The establishment of such a commission,
with legislative recognition, affords an organized medium through
which the combined recommendations of judges, practitioners,
law professors and groups interested in law reform can be placed
before the Legislature in a manner calculated to be most effective.
A more complete discussion of the purposes and objectives of the
Louisiana State Law Institute will be found elsewhere in the
pages of the Review.8
Another significant statute passed at the recent session is the
one which provided for a Louisiana Commission on Interstate
Cooperation.' Through this Commission it is planned to have
Louisiana participate in the work of the Council of State Governments, and cooperation in legislative, judicial, executive and governmental problems is sought to be accomplished.' 0 Also in the
realm of law reform is the statute which extends until 1940 the
time allowed for the Commission appointed to draft a Criminal
Code for the State of Louisiana to complete its report."
The enacted legislation ranged over many divergent matters
and the volume of statutory material is so great that it is obviously difficult to condense an analysis of all enactments within
reasonable limits. It has, therefore, been necessary to eliminate
from the discussion in this article a number of important statutes,
particularly the Trust Act 12 and the Public Welfare Revenue
Act.'8 For similar reasons fiscal matters, matters pertaining to
political subdivisions and state governmental departments and
their powers, tax statutes, and measures of a purely regulatory
character have been omitted in order to permit encompassing this
review within the available space. Subject to the foregoing observations, discussion of a group of the statutes thought to be of
interest to practising lawyers will be presented. In many instances the classification is arbitrarily adopted merely for convenience in discussion and no significance or importance is intended
to be attached to the order in which the topics are considered.
7. La. Act 166 of 1938.
8. See Tucker, The Louisiana State Law Institute (1938) 1 La. L. Rev. 139.
9. La. Act 79 of 1938.
10. La. Act 79 of 1938, 1 6.
11. La. Act 98 of 1938.
12. La. Act 81 of 1938.
13. La Act 2 of 1938.
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I. MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE CIVIL CODE

A. AMENDMENTS TO SPECIFIC CODAL ARTICLES

(a) Article 80 repealed. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code,
when one spouse had been absent and unheard of for a period of
ten years, the other spouse was at liberty to contract another marriage, after authorization by the judge, upon due proof: (1) that
the marriage was contracted here; (2) that the applicant was
domiciled in this State at the time of the application, or had resided here for ten years. 1 Such cases fall within the codal provisions relative to dissolution of the marriage. 15 The purpose of Article 80 was to make possible a second marriage in the event of
such absence but all the necessary facts had to be proved before
the court could grant its authorization. 16 Although mere lapse of
time following disappearance does not of itself raise a presumption of death,'17 together with other circumstances, it may warrant
a court of competent jurisdiction to declare a person dead. 8 It
would seem that such judicial declaration is sufficient to dissolve
the marriage, 9 but in case of absence the first marriage would
have been dissolved only when the second marriage had been
contracted in full compliance with Article 80.20 This article therefore had a definite relationship to the problem of absence and dissolution of the marriage.
14. Art. 80, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Ten years of absence, without any
news of the absentee, is a sufficient cause for the husband or wife of such
absentee to contract another marriage, after having been authorized to do
so by the judge on due proof, that the marriage was contracted in this State,
and that the applicant is now domiciled in this State, or that the applicant
has resided for full ten years in this State, without having had in either case
any news of the existence of the other spouse during the said ten years; provided that the petitioning husband or wife shall be a competent witness in
such proceeding. And if after the said marriage the husband or wife who
was absent, happens to return, he or she shall be free of his or her first
contract, and at liberty to contract another marriage, and the marriage entered by the husband or wife during and on account of the said absence shall
remain firm and valid." (As amended by Act 211 of 1916).
15. Art. 136, La. Civil Code of 1870. See Johnston v. Johnston, 32 La. Ann.
1139, 1140 (1880).
16. McCaffrey v. Benson, 38 La. Ann. 198 (1886.) However, even if such a
second marriage is invalid, it may be considered a putative marriage under
Art. 117, La. Civil Code of 1870 if the parties were in good faith. McCaffrey v.
Benson, 40 La. Ann. 10, 3 So. 393 (1888).
17. Quaker Realty Co. v. Starkey, 136 La. 28, 66 So. 386 (1914); Bennett v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 180 La. 238, 156 So. 290 (1934);
Clay v. District Grand Lodge No. 21, Etc. of La., 154 So. 654 (La. App. 1934).
18. Sterrett v. Samuel, 108 La. 346, 32 So. 428 (1902); Marrero v. Nelson,
166 La. 122, 116 So. 722 (1928).
19. Cf. McCaffrey v. Benson, 38 La. Ann. 198, 202 (1886); Art. 136, La.
Civil Code of 1870.
20. On this point the Article seems clear and free from ambiguity. McCaffrey v. Benson, 38 La. Ann. 198 (1886) was the only relevant case found.
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At the recent session of the Legislature Article 80 was repealed, 1 the argument being that it was rendered inoperative and
'22
unnecessary by reason of the so-called "seven-year divorce law.
But this argument is entirely unfounded in view of the interpretation placed on the statutory period divorce laws of 1916 and 1932
to the effect that the parties must have separated voluntarily by
mutual consent or through the abandonment by one spouse because of conditions which made living together impossible. 3 The
purpose of these divorce laws is to relieve intolerable situations
brought about by the incompatibility of husband and wife. 24 According to the jurisprudence, not all cases of separation would be
covered by these statutes.2 5 For example, if the husband and wife
were happily married and the husband was drafted for military
service after which he was unheard of for more than the statutory
period, no court would in the light of the previous jurisprudence
grant a divorce. Yet formerly, under Article 80, if the absence continued for 10 years without news of the absentee, the other spouse
would be at liberty to contract another marriage. The repealed
article was a typical "Enoch Arden Law" designed to remedy the
situation in which the separation has been due to circumstances
other than incompatibility. Since the statutory period divorce
law does not cover all situations of absence the removal of Article
80 from the Code is to be regretted. This provision should be
re-enacted at an early date.
(b) Article 113 amended and re-enacted. As this article appeared in the Civil Code of 1870 it provided that marriages contracted in violation of the incapacities or nullities enumerated in
the Code might "be impeached either by the married persons
21. La. Act 357 of 1938.
22. La. Act 269 of 1916 authorized a divorce when the parties had lived
separate and apart for seven years. La. Act 31 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1932)
§ 2202] reduced the statutory period to four years. At the recent session by
virtue of the passage of Act 430 of 1938 the period was further reduced to two
years. See infra p. 97.
23. In Vincent v. LeDoux, 146 La. 144, 83 So. 439 (1919) It was held that
for the purposes of the 1916 Act, the cause of the separation was immaterial,
but this view has been repudiated twice by the Supreme Court, Artigues v.
Lalande (not reported; No. 26752 of the Supreme Court Docket (1925));
Leveque v. Borns, 174 La. 919, 142 So. 126 (1932).
24. The Legislature was prompted to enact the Seven-Year Divorce Law
of 1916 by the same reason which allows the guilty spouse to obtain a divorce
by the lapse of a statutory period after a judicial separation. Dowie v.
Becker, 149 La. 160, 88 So. 777 (1921).
25. Leveque v. Borns, 174 La. 919, 142 So. 126 (1932); Galiano v. Monteleone, 178 La. 567, 152 So. 126 (1934).
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themselves, or by any 26 person interested, or by the Attorney
General." By amendment in 1904 a proviso was added reading:
however, first that marriages heretofore7 contracted
between persons, related within the prohibited degrees either
or both of whom were then and afterward2 domiciled in this
State and were prohibited from intermarrying here, shall nevertheless be deemed valid in this State, where such marriages
were celebrated in other States or countries under the laws of
which they were not prohibited; second, that marriages here29
after contracted between persons, either or both of whom are
domiciled in this State and are forbidden to intermarry, shall
not be deemed valid in this State, because contracted in another State or country"° where such marriages are not prohibited, if the parties, after such marriage, return to reside permanently in this State."3' 1 (Italics supplied.)
The 1938 amendment to Article 11332 was introduced for the
avowed purpose of legalizing marriages between first cousins contracted in the interim between 1912 (the last re-enactment) and
1938.31 The result is that marriages between persons related
within the prohibited degrees "heretofore contracted" in other
States shall be valid but that such marriages "hereafter con26. (Italics supplied) The word "any" in the original revision of the La.
Civil Code of 1870 was not changed by either the 1904 or 1912 amendments
and therefore erroneously reads "the" in Dart's, Revised Civil Code. See La.
Act 129 of 1904 and Act 54 of 1912.
27. By the 1912 amendment this word was changed to "heretobefore."
28. By the 1912 amendment this word was changed to "afterwards."
29. By the 1912 amendment "are" was changed to "were."
30. This word reads "county" in the amendment of 1912, but apparently
it was a typographical error.
31. Art. 113, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act 129 of 1904.
32. La. Act 426 of 1938 amends Article 113 so that it now reads: "Every
marriage contracted under the other incapacities or nullities enumerated in
the second chapter of this title may be impeached either by the married
persons themselves, or by any person interested, or by the Attorney General;
however, marriages heretofore contracted between persons related within the
prohibited degrees, either or both of whom were then and afterwards domiciled in this State, and were prohibited from intermarrying therein, shall
nevertheless be deemed valid in this State, where such marriages were celebrated in other States or countries under the laws of which they are not
prohibited; but marriages hereafter contracted between persons, either or
both of whom were domiciled in this State and are forbidden to intermarry
shall not be deemed valid in this State, because contracted in another State
or country where such marriages are not prohibited, if the parties after
such marriage, return to reside permanently in this State."
Aside from omitting superfluous language no change is effected. It is to
be noted that this act was vetoed by the Governor and his veto later recalled.
See note 2, supra.
33. See Art. 95, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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tracted" shall be invalid. It would seem extremely doubtful
whether the intention of the Legislature in this respect is sufficiently clear. Does the re-enactment of this article of the Code
have the effect of validating prior marriages merely by virtue of
the fact that the words "heretofore contracted" are contained in
the article? It seems that this was the viewpoint of the sponsors
of the act and the courts will probably give the legislation the
effect intended.
(c) Article 915-Surviving spouse made legal heir to community property. A change of importance in the right of the surviving spouse to the undisposed portion of the community property was made by Act 408 of 1938 which amended Article 915 so
that the surviving spouse shall inherit in such cases "as a legal
heir by operation of law, and without the necessity of compliance
with the forms of law provided in this chapter for the placing of
irregular heirs in possession of the successions to which they are
called."' Article 915 applies only to community property and not
to the separate property of either of the spouses. When the deceased leaves neither father nor mother nor descendants, his undisposed share in the community is inherited by the surviving
spouse in full ownership. If a father and mother or either survives, the deceased's share in the community is divided into two
equal portions, one of which goes to the parent (s) and the other
to the surviving spouse. In this situation the surviving spouse
was formerly classed as an irregular heir and had to be placed
formally in possession in compliance with the rules for irregular
heirs.3 5 Since one-half of the community property vests in the
surviving spouse in his or her right and not by inheritance, it was
doubtless the intention of the Legislature to facilitate administration of community property in this situation. When a mother or
father or both share the community with the surviving spouse under Article 915, such ascendants are classed as legal heirs,8 7 and the
effect of the 1938 amendment is to eliminate the discrimination
34. La. Act 408 of 1938 adds the matter quoted in the text to Art. 915.
In other respects the prior language of that article, as amended by La. Acts
57 of 1910, 80 of 1916, and 160 of 1920, is re-enacted.
35. Daggett, The Community Property System of Louisiana (1931) 92. The
distinction between legal or regular successions and irregular successions is
fundamental in the Louisiana civil law. The maxim "le mort saisit le vif"
does not apply to irregular successions. Irregular heirs have only a right of
action to cause themselves to be placed in possession of the succession. See
Arts. 940-945, 949, La. Civil Code of 1870.
36. Cf. Art. 2406, La. Civil Code of 1870.
37. Cf. Art. 887, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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against a surviving spouse who comes to the succession concurrently with other legal heirs.
(d) Articles 938 and 939. Amendments relating to commorientes. Prior to 1938 the rules establishing presumptions of survivorship when persons perished in the same accident or event
were contained in these articles which were almost literal translations of the corresponding articles of the French Civil Code."
No provision was made for the following situations: (1) when
one of the persons was under fifteen and the other was over fifteen but under sixty; (2) when one was between fifteen and sixty
and the other over sixty; (3) when both were between fifteen and
sixty-the difference in their ages being more than one yearand of different sexes.89
The Louisiana courts have not been called upon to determine
the sufficiency of these articles. In fact the only case discussing
0
in which
and applying these articles is Succession of Langles,4
the decision was governed by the second paragraph of Article
939. In France the situations not specifically covered by the Code
are solved by analogy to the other provisions, thus where one of
the decedents was fifty years old and the other sixty-five, the
younger is presumed to have survived." However, some of the
commentators advocate a strict construction of the presumptions
2
and argue that they should not be extended by implication.'
The Quebec Civil Code, also modeled after the Code Napoleon, covers the situations not provided for in our Code,' 8 and al88. Arts. 721, 722, French Civil Code.
39. Cf. Comment (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 623, 627.
40. 105 La. 39, 29 So. 739 (1901).
41. 7 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Wahl, Trait. Thdorique et Pratique de
Droit Civil, Des Successions, I (3 ed. 1905) 86, No 121; 4 Planiol et Ripert,
Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1928) 44-45, No 30.
42. Planiol et Ripert, loc. cit. supra note 41, and authorities therein cited.
43. Art. 604, Quebec Civil Code provides: "Where those who perished together were under fifteen years of age, the eldest is presumed to have survived; if they were all above the age of sixty, the youngest is presumed to
have survived; if some were under the age of fifteen and others over that of
sixty, the former are presumed to have survived; if some were under fifteen
or over sixty years of age, and the others in the intermediate age, the
presumption of survivorship is in favor of the latter."
Art. 605, Quebec Civil Code provides: "If those who perished together
were all between the full ages of fifteen and sixty, and of the same sex, the
order of nature is followed, according to which the youngest is presumed to
survive; but, if they were of different sexes, the male is always presumed
to have survived."

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I

though somewhat different language is employed a similar result"
has been obtained by the 1938 amendments which read: 41
Art. 938. "If those who have perished together were under the age of fifteen years, the eldest shall be presumed to
have survived.
If they were above the age of sixty years, the youngest
shall be presumed to have survived.
If some were under sixty years of age, and some were
sixty years of age or older, the first shall be presumed to have
survived.
If some were under the age of fifteen years, and some were
fifteen years or older and less than sixty years of age, the latter
shall be presumed to have survived."
Art. 939. "If those who have perished together were fifteen
years of age or older and under sixty years, the male shall be
presumed to have survived, where there was an equality of
age, or a difference of less than one year, otherwise, the younger
must be presumed to have to have survived the elder whether
male or female." (Italics supplied)
These amendments to Articles 938 and 939 will serve the purpose
of definitely settling and clarifying the rules on the presumption
of survivorship.
(e) Article 1364.-Amendment relating to partitions in kind.
Although this article is in the chapter of the Civil Code dealing
with the mode of partitioning succession property, it applies to all
cases in which property is to be partitioned in kind between coowners." The article now reads:
Art. 1364. "When the deductions have been made, and
those to whom the collations were due have received them, as
is said in the preceding article, the officer divides what remains
into as many equal lots as there are heirs, or roots entitled to a
share.
44. There is one difference: In the case where the persons who perished
were a male of 25 and a female of 16-according to the Quebec Civil Code
(Art. 605) the male would be presumed to have survived; under the amended

Louisiana provisions (Art. 939) the female would be presumed to have survived. If the male was 16 and the female 25, the Quebec presumption (Art.
605) is in favor of the male, and a similar result would follow in Louisiana
(Art. 939 as amended) since the male is the younger. The difference is that

where persons are of different sexes and both are between 15 and 60 years
of age, the male survives under Quebec Law, while in Louisiana the younger

survives, whether male or female.
45. La. Act 418 of 1938, amending Arts. 938, 939, La. Civil Code of 1870.
46. Art. 1290, La. Civil Code of 1870 provides: "All the rules established
in the present Chapter [Succession Partition] ...

are applicable to partitions
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'No subdivision of the lots thus formed need be made between the individual co-proprietors claiming under the same
root.
A partition thus made, even without a subdivision being
made of the lots to which each root may be entitled, shall be a
definitive partition."
The matter in italics was added by the amending Act 407 of
1938. To understand the purpose of this addition it must be remembered that when property is to be partitioned judicially in
kind, experts are appointed by the court to divide the property
into as many "equal lots as there are heirs, or roots entitled to a
share," so that where two persons own property in indivision in
the proportion of 1/7 to 6/7, the property is divided into 7 lots as
nearly equal as possible, of which one lot shall be drawn by one of
the co-owners and the remaining six by the other.4 7 It makes little
difference that the lots are not exactly equal, because any difference in value is compensated in money by the one who receives
4
the more valuable lot.

8

Although Article 1364 seems clear and unambiguous in providing that the property should be divided into as many lots as
there are heirs, "or roots entitled to a share," confusion has arisen
in its application. In Succession of Story,49 it was held that a partition made by roots was not definitive until the share coming to
each root had been subdivided among the parties to whom it had
descended. In that case there were three minor heirs owning
property in indivision with two other heirs. The property was divided into five lots. Three of these lots were selected by the tutrix
of the three minor children and the other two were given one each
to the remaining co-heirs. An appeal was taken by the latter who
contended that the proceedings were void because the minors
were not individually represented by a separate tutor and that
consequently the lots had not been drawn by each heir or co-ownbetween co-proprietors of the same thing . . . when the co-proprietors . . .
cannot agree on the partition and on the manner of making it." Wells v. Files,
136 La. 126, 139, 66 So. 749, 754 (1914); Grouchy v. Williams, 161 La. 909, 109

So. 545 (1926); Raceland Bk. & T. Co. v. Toups, 173 La. 742, 750, 138 So. 652,
655 (1931); Jefferson Lake Oil Co. v. Loughridge, 182 La. 57, 161 So. 19 (1935).
47. Raceland Bk. & T. Co. v. Toups, 173 La. 742, 138 So. 652 (1931).

48. Art. 1366, La. Civil Code of 1870: "When the lots are of unequal value,
such inequality is compensated by means of a return of money, which the
co-heir, having a lot of more value than the other, pays to his co-heirs."
Kaffle v. Wilson, 130 La. 350, 57 So. 1001 (1912); Hoss v. Hardeman, 156 La.

371, 100 So. 532 (1924); see also Rayner v. Rayner, 171 La. 1050, 132 So. 784
(1931).

49. 5 La. Ann. 208 (1850).
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er as provided by law. The court upheld this contention stating
that it was necessary for each minor to be represented in order to
avoid a second partition as between the minors. The court further said:
"The warranty which the heirs are to give each other in
final partitions, makes it necessary that the share of each
should be determined and fixed contradictorily with the others, and, accordingly, the rule is, that a partition made by
roots, is not definitive, unless the share coming to each root,
has been subdivided among the parties to whom it has descended."50 (Italics supplied)
The holding of the court in Succession of Story was correct
as applied to the facts presented, but the court went too far in
making the statement quoted above. Nevertheless, the same doctrine was announced in the later case of Amite Bank & Trust Co.
v. Singleton.- In that case there were seven co-owners: the plaintiff owned one-half of the property, three minor defendants owned
one-fourth in indivision, and three other major defendants owned
one-fourth in indivision. Plaintiff sued for a partition by licitation contending that the property could not be conveniently divided in kind. The three major defendants opposed his claim
praying that the property be divided either (1) into two lots, in
which case the plaintiff would draw one lot and defendants another, or (2) into four equal lots, in which case each set of defendants (three minors and three majors) would draw one lot and
the plaintiff two lots. The court held, however, that under the authority of Succession of Story, each of the defendants should draw
one lot for himself; that since there were six co-owners claiming
one-half of the property, and that since the plaintiff was entitled
to have a definitive partition with the defendants, the property
would have had to be divided into twelve parts, which was not
feasible without cantling of tenements, and that therefore the
partition should be made by licitation. It is to be inferred that
the court regarded the defendants as claiming under one root with
the plaintiff claiming under another, and that in order to have a
definitive partition, the subdivision as between all the heirs of
one root should be made at the same time.
The decision in Amite Bank & Trust Co. v. Singleton was
clearly erroneous in view of Article 1364, which specifically pro50. Id. at 211.
51. 135 La. 185, 65 So. 102 (1914).
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vides that the division should be made, in case it is between roots,
in as many equal parts as there are roots. Thus the defendant's
first contention was sound and the property should have been divided in two lots since there were two roots. The error into which
the court fell is more evident when we consider Article 1370 which
provides that the rules established for the division of estates to be
partitioned, are equally applicable for the subdivisions to be made
between the individual co-proprietors claiming under the same
root.
In other words, the Code contemplates that two partitions are
to take place: one as between the roots; the other as between the
co-heirs of each root.5 2 That this should be the rule is evident
from the fact that the law stands firm on the following point-if
the only way to partition the property in kind is to divide it into
numberless small lots, the court should refuse to allow the partition but order a sale of the property so as to effect a partition by
licitation.5 8
In Kaffie v. Wilson," the court correctly applied Articles 1364
and 1370, and held that the partition in kind should be made by
roots and as there were ten roots there should be ten equal lots,
without the division between the co-owners of one of the lots being considered. This decision, however, stands alone and no mention was made in it of Succession of Story; and in Amite Bank &
Trust Co. v. Singleton the court makes no reference whatever to
the Kafjie case.
In the light of the foregoing, the apparent purpose of Act 407
of 1938 in amending Article 1364 was to settle the law on this important point. The amendment codifies the doctrine of Kaffie v.
Wilson, by providing that as between the co-proprietors claiming
under the same root no subdivision need be made. Thus in determining the advisability of dividing the property, the court-in
fixing the number of lots-must not take into consideration the
number of heirs under each root but only the number of roots.
The provision that a partition so made is definitive is, of course,
52. For example, suppose X dies leaving three children A, B, C. A dies
prior to the opening of X's succession leaving three children, D, E, F. There
is one piece of property owned In indivision. The property should be divided
Into 3 lots, one lot to be drawn by the children of A (who inherit by representation), the other two to be drawn by B and C, respectively. As between the
children of A (D, E, F), they will divide their lot (1/3) in the same manner
and according to the same rules. Arts. 1364, 1370, La. Civil Code of 1870.
53. Jefferson Lake Oil Co. v. Loughridge, 182 L a. 57, 161 So. 19 (1935).
54. 130 La. 350, 57 So, 100l (1912),
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intended to abrogate the language used by the court in Succession
of Story. It does not, nor can it mean that a partition thus made
is final with regard to the co-owners of each root, for no one can
be compelled to own property in indivision. Furthermore, Article
1370 expressly provides that the co-owners under each root shall
divide the property as between themselves in accordance with the
rules laid down in Article 1364.
As a companion measure to the 1938 amendment of Article
1364, a separate statute provides that actions to revoke or annul
judicial partitions in kind, where the sole ground for attack is
that the partition was made by root and no subdivision was made
between the individual co-proprietors claiming under the same
root, shall be prescribed by the lapse of six months from the pro55
mulgation of this statute.

(f) Article 3369.-Amendment relative to reinscription of
legal mortgages. Prior to 1938 this article specifically provided
that its requirements of reinscription had no application to legal
mortgages for dowry or other claims of wives, nor to legal mortgages in favor of minors, interdicts and absentees.6 6 Act 322 of
1938 has changed Article 3369 by deleting the former provisions
relative to such legal mortgages and by inserting, in lieu thereof,
the following two paragraphs:
"The effect of the registry of mortgages to which husbands
are subject for the dowry and other claims of wives ceases in
all cases, even against the husband or his heirs, if the inscriptions have not been renewed within ten years after the dissolution of the marriage.
"The effect of the registry with regard to the mortgages of
tutors and curators in favor of minors, interdicted and absent
persons whose estates they administer, ceases in all cases, even
against the tutor and curator, as follows: in cases of minors,
four years after the majority of the minor, in cases of interdicted persons, four years after the death of the interdict or
the termination of the interdiction, and in cases of absent persons, ten years after the termination of the curatorship."
55. Act 406 of 1938 was published July 19th, 1938. The six months prescriptive period according to the terms of the statute runs from the date
of promulgation.
56. Art. 3369, La. Civil Code of 1870 (as amended by La. Act 227 of 1918

and Act 50 of 1924). ". . . None of the foregoing provisions of this article shall
obtain with regard to the mortgages to which husbands are subject for the

dowry and other claims of wives and tutors and curators towards minors,
interdicted and absent persons whose estates they administer ..."
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The purpose of the amendment is to make provision for and to
require the reinscription of legal mortgages existing in favor of
wives, minors, interdicts and absentees.
In interpreting Article 3369 it had been repeatedly held that
omission to reinscribe the mortgage within ten years from the
date of the original inscription did not affect the existence of the
mortgage but only caused the effect of its inscription to cease.5"
A mortgage was, therefore, valid and binding as between the
parties even where no inscription whatever had been made, and
lack of reinscription could not affect the parties to it, despite the
provision that the effect of the reinscription ceased even against
the contractingparties.58
Wife's legal mortgage. The wife has a legal mortgage on the
property of her husband for the restitution or reimbursement of
57. Consolidated Ass'n v. Wilson, 10 La. Ann. 591 (1855); Police Jury of
West Baton Rouge v. Bergeron, 11 La. Ann. 390 (1856); Harman & Stringfellow v. Legrande, 151 La. 253, 91 So. 726 (1922); Devereaux v. Reid, 13 Orl.
App. 219 (La., 1916); Commercial Nat'l Bank of Shreveport v. McDaniel, 156
So. 43 (La. App. 1934). In connection with Art. 3369, there should be considered Art. 3305, which originally read: "A conventional mortgage can only
be contracted by an act passed in presence of a notary and two witnesses, or
by an act under private signature. No proof can be admitted of a verbal
mortgage. Hypothecations of ships and other vessels are made according to
the laws and usages of commerce." This was amended by Act 105 of 1916 so
as to provide for the hypothecation of power boats, sail boats, dredges,
barges, "and all other kinds of water craft plying wholly within the navigable
waters of this State. . . . All such mortgages or hypothecations must be
recorded in the parish where the owner resides and shall prescribe in 10
years from the date of registry." (Italics supplied). The question necessarily
arose as to whether it was the purpose of the amendment to provide for the
prescription of mortgages in general. The answer was in the negative, the
court holding that the proviso relative to the, prescription was intended to
apply only to those mortgages for the authorizing of which original provision
had been made by the Act, viz.; power boats, sail boats, etc., and that mortgages in general did not prescribe by the lapse of ten years. Harman & Stringfellow v. Legrande, 151 La. 253, 260, 91 So. 726, 728 (1922): "So far as the act
of 1916 is concerned, its title expresses no intention of legislating on the subjects of registry and prescription, for it reads, 'An act to amend and re-enact
article 3305 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870,' and that article has no reference to registry or prescription ....
If, therefore, the purpose of said act of
1916 was to legislate on the subjects of registry and prescription of conventional mortgages in general, that purpose failed because of noncompliance
with the constitutional provision requiring the objects of acts to be expressed
in their titles. But, very evidently, such was not the purpose; but, in saying
that 'all such mortgages or hypothecations must be recorded in the parish
where the owner resides and shall prescribe in ten years from the date of
registry,' the intention was to impose such condition only upon those certain
'mortgages and hypothecations' for the authorizing of which the act makes
original provision, namely, of power boats, sailing vessels, pull boats, etc."
58. In Commercial Nat'l Bank of Shreveport v. McDaniel, 156 So. 43 (La.
App. 1934) the court quotes with approval from Syburn & Deyris, 25 La. Ann.
483 (1873) as follows: "There is no force in the objection that the mortgage
perempted for want of reinscription within ten years. Neither inscription nor
reinscription is necessary, so far as the parties to the mortgage or their heirs
are concerned." (156 So. at 47-48)
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her paraphernal property and for the restitution of her dowry,5"
and the husband is under a legal duty to have this tacit or legal
mortgage recorded.60 It is to be noted, however, that while establishing such mortgage, the Civil Code does not provide for the
time during which it shall exist. In view of the fact that a mortgage is an accessory obligation, it follows that the mortgage of the
wife on the property of her husband will be good, at least as between themselves, as long as the husband is indebted to the wife."
This indebtedness, like all other personal obligations, would be
causa but runextinguished by the ten year prescription liberandi
62
ning only from the dissolution of the marriage.
Under the 1938 amendment to Article 3369, it is now provided
that in the case of the wife's legal mortgage the "effect of the
registry" shall cease if the inscription is not renewed within ten
years from the dissolution of the marriage. This language would
therefore seem to evidence an intention to protect third persons.
In other words, in the light of the prior jurisprudence dealing
with the effect of registry and failure to reinscribe, the Article as
amended, means that the wife's mortgage may be enforced against
the husband and his heirs even after ten years from the dissolution of the marriage, but if no reinscription has been made within
such period, a second mortgage given by the husband in favor of
a third person would take precedence over that of the wife.68 Of
course, unless the original debt of the husband is kept alive for
longer than ten years, the reinscription of the mortgage, even if
timely, would have no effect, for once the mortgage debt is extinguished, reinscription could not revive it.
Legal mortgage of minors, interdicts and absentees. Under
the Code, minors, interdicts and absentees are given a legal mortgage on the property of their tutors and curators as security for
their administration. 4 The action against the tutor, in the case of
minors, is prescribed in four years from majority. 5 It consequently follows that since the indebtedness of the tutor to the
59. Arts. 2376, 3319, La. Civil Code of 1870.
60. Arts. 3330, 3332, La. Civil Code of 1870; Wilson v. Chalaron, 26 La. Ann.
641 (1874); Koening v. Huck, 51 La. Ann. 1368, 26 So. 543 (1899).
61. Cf. Art. 3284, La. Civil Code of 1870.
62. Cf. Arts. 2364, 2367, 2368, La. Civil Code of 1870.
63. It may be contended that the language "even against the husband
and his heirs" leads to a contrary conclusion. But the words "even against
contracting parties" In the preceding paragraph of Article 3369 have not been
so interpreted. See cases cited in note 58, supra.
64. Art. 3314, La. Civil Code of 1870.
65. Art. 362, La. Civil Code of 1870. Rhodes v. Cooper, 113 La. 600, 37 So.
527 (1904); Flaspoller Co. v. Siess, 6 La. App. 827 (1927).
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minor will be extinguished at the expiration of the four year
period, the tacit mortgage as accessory is also extinguished. 66 It is
only in cases in which the action of the minor against his tutor is
kept alive beyond the expiration of the four year period that the
amended provision requiring reinscription will come into operation, for, as indicated above, no reinscription is necessary as between the parties. Similar rules apply to the case in which an
67
interdict has a mortgage on the property of his curator.
The legal mortgage of the absentee exists until the final account, but there are no codal provisions respecting the time
allowed to the absentee, should he happen to return, to attack the
validity or correctness of the accounting.6 8 It follows from the
codal provisions that when a final account has been rendered
by the curator his administration is ended, and that with certain
exceptions this administration generally ends in five years, when
the presumptive heirs are sent into provisional possession.6 9 The
mortgage thus expires upon the homologation of the final account,
and therefore even if the mortgage is reinscribed after such
homologation but before the expiration of the time prescribed
by Article 3369, this will be of no effect because the reinscription
of a dead mortgage cannot revive it.
B.

STATUTES RELATING TO CIVIL CODE SUBJECT MATTER

(a) Adoption. The Civil Code contains only Article 214
relative to adoption and this matter is regulated almost entirely
by statutory provisions. The two new statutes of importance are
Act 428 of 1938 which establishes an entirely new procedure for
adoption of persons under seventeen years of age, and Act 390
of 1938 which proposed a constitutional amendment to confer
jurisdiction on the juvenile courts of Orleans Parish for all adoptions of children under seventeen.
It will be recalled that as a result of the decision in Succession of Dyer,70 which held Act 46 of 1932 unconstitutional insofar
66. Art. 3285, La. Civil Code of 1870; Aillot v. Aubert, 20 La. Ann. 509
(1868). See also note 65, supra.
67. Since the rules relative to tutorship apply to cases of interdiction
(Art. 415, La. Civil Code of 1870) the right of the interdict to sue for an accounting will be prescribed by the lapse of four years after the interdiction
has been lifted. Therefore, unless the obligation of the curator to account has

been kept alive for more than four years after the interdiction has ended, the
debt and the mortgage security will have been extinguished, and even timely

reinscription will be of no effect.
68. Art. 3314, La. Civil Code of 1870.
69. Arts. 55, 57, La. Civil Code of 1870; see also Arts. 52, 53, 58, 60.

70. 184 La. 251, 166 So. 68 (1936); see also In re State, In Interest of Embrey, 181 La. 1025, 160 So. 799 (1935).
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as it conferred jurisdiction over adoption matters on the juvenile
courts, a constitutional amendment was adopted in 193671 providing that the juvenile courts shall have jurisdiction "in all
adoption proceedings of children under seventeen years of age."
This amendment, however, had no application to the Parish of
Orleans and the adoption of the constitutional amendment proposed by Act 390 of 1938 has the effect of conferring similar
jurisdiction on the juvenile courts of the Parish of Orleans.
By virtue of the Dyer decision a properly executed notarial
act of adoption, signed and recorded, was sufficient for the legal
adoption of minors under seventeen. But by another statute of
193672 passed as an enabling act to accompany the 1936 constitutional amendment, provision was made for judicial approval
by the juvenile courts in addition to the formality of a notarial
7

act.

3

The new 1938 statute 74 specifically repeals the 1936 act and
substitutes adoption entirely by judicial procedure in the juvenile
courts with supervision and reports by the State Department of
Public Welfare. Instead of a notarial act, adoption proceedings
are to be started by petition. 75 Provision is made for an interlocutory decree of adoption which may be confirmed by final
decree after expiration of not less than six months, provided
that the adopted child has lived in the home of the person
granted the interlocutory decree for a period of not less than
one year. The new statute raises a number of questions of interpretation regarding the effects of adoption which are discussed
70
in a Comment elsewhere in this Review.

From a policy standpoint, the new adoption act is open to
serious criticism in that it lengthens considerably the period
required to perfect an adoption. Adoptive parents should not be
unduly discouraged by lengthy investigations and undue legal
delays. The procedure formerly in effect under the 1936 Act
seemed adequate to protect the interest of all parties and it is
to be feared that one result of the 1938 Act will be to discourage
adoptions. The 1938 Adoption Act was one of the measures vetoed
71. La. Act 324 of 1936, adopted as a constitutional amendment on November 3, 1936.
72. La. Act 233 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1937) §§ 4839. 10 et seq.]
73. Cf. Succession of Pizzati, 141 La. 645, 673, 75 So. 498 (1917); In re
Brand's Estate, 153 La. 195, 95 So. 603 (1923).
74. La. Act 428 of 1938.
75. La. Act 428 of 1938, § 2.
76. See Comment on Adoption, infra p. 196.
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by the Governor and later recalled and approved; its constitutionality is therefore open to question."
Another statute relating to adoption is Act 427 of 1938. Under
the terms of a 1910 statute,1 8 if a child is legally released to a
charitable institution-either by both parents or by one of them
where the child has been abandoned by the other-all parental
rights cease and such child may be given in adoption by the in79
stitution. Prior to 1938 if a child was not such a foundling
three years of non-support of a child by its parents would cut
off parental rights.8 0 By the terms of Act 427 of 1938,81 the necessary period of non-support has been reduced to one year. Since
the great majority of Louisiana adoptions are effected through
charitable institutions, this Act will tend to facilitate the adoption
of children not classed as foundlings and for whom legal release
of parental rights could not be obtained.
(b) Divorce. Act 430 of 1938 which allows divorce of married
persons who have been living separate and apart for a period of
two years or more, bears an important relation to the codal
articles dealing with divorce.8 2 It will be recalled that in 1916
the so-called Seven Year Divorce Law was passed, providing
that when the spouses have been living separate and apart for
seven years either may sue for divorce on such ground.88 The
statutory period was reduced in 1932 to four years,8' and the
1938 statute now further reduces it to two years.8 5 Since no other
change is effected except that of reducing the period of separation required, it follows that the interpretation placed upon the
earlier statutes will be carried by necessary implication into
the 1938 Act. It will be of interest, therefore, to consider some
of the questions raised by this type of statute.
The Supreme Court has pointed out that the purpose of these
statutes is to provide for cases in which the relationship between
husband and wife is so incompatible that their living together
is absolutely impossible, and yet one of the spouses though
unwilling to become reconciled refuses-for any reason-to in77.
78.
Monroe
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See note 2, supra.
La. Act 173 of 1910, § 5 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 4895]; cf. State ex rel
v. Ford, 164 La. 149, 113 So. 798 (1927).
See Art. 213, La. Civil Code of 1870.
La. Act 173 of 1910, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 4893].
Amending and re-enacting La. Act 173 of 1910, § 3.
Arts. 138-161, La. Civil Code of 1870.
La. Act 269 of 1916.
La. Act 31 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 2202].
La. Act 430 of 193&
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stitute divorce or separation proceedings against the other.84 It
is well settled that, in order to bring these statutes into application, the separation of the spouses must be either voluntary
or by the abandonment of one by the other; an involuntary separation will not suffice."' Even the party guilty of the abandonment
may invoke the statute; the period of separation may include
time which elapsed prior to the passage of the statute, since a
statute of this type is remedial in nature and may be given retrospective operation."
Although the separation need not be mutually voluntary,
cases in which the separation began with the interdiction of
one of the spouses or by confinement to an asylum, or by other
similar causes, do not give rise to this action for divorce. 9 But
if the separation is "voluntary," the courts are not concerned
with, nor will they inquire into, the causes which induced the
separation or abandonment.9 0
The right of the divorced wife to alimony should be considered in connection with the 1938 Act. Prior to 1928, there
was no law allowing alimony when a judgment was obtained
by the husband under the seven year divorce law and the wife
had not been at fault.91 Alimony could be awarded to the wife
when the divorce was rendered on her complaint and in her
favor, but not when the judgment was rendered on the husband's
complaint and in his favor. 2 This situation was corrected by a
1928 statute which amended Article 160 of the Louisiana Civil
Code so as to allow the wife alimony when judgment was rendered against her on the ground of living separate and apart for
"a period of seven years," provided that she had not been at
fault.9
86. Dowie v. Becker, 149 La. 160, 88 So. 777 (1921); cf. Tortorich v. Maestry, 146 La. 124, 83 So. 431 (1919).
87. Cf. Leveque v. Borns,174 La. 919, 142 So. 126 (1932); Galiano v. Monteleone, 178 La. 567, 152 So. 126 (1934).
88. Dowie v. Becker, 149 La. 160, 88 So. 777 (1921); cf. Stallings v. Stallings, 177 La. 488, 148 So. 687 (1933) (involving a similar situation under Act
56 of 1932).
89. Leveque v. Borns, 174 La. 919, 142 So. 126 (1932); Galiano v. Monteleone, 178 La. 567, 152 So. 126 (1934).
90. Stallings v. Stallings, 179 La. 663, 154 So. 729 (1934).
91. North v. North, 164 La. 293, 113 So. 852 (1927); but cf. La. Act 25 of
1898 as amended by La. Act 56 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1932) J 2209) providing
that when the husband, against whom a separation from bed and board has
been rendered, sues for and obtains the divorce which follows, the wife shall
be entitled to alimony in the discretion of the court; see also Bernard v.
Gonzales, 170 La. 473, 128 So. 281 (1930).
92. Art. 160, La. Civil Code of 1870.
93. La. Act 21 of 1928 amending Art. 160, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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After the 1932 statute reducing the required period of separation to four years, it was held that the wife was not entitled to
alimony when judgment of divorce was rendered against her. In
Blakely v. Magnon,94 the court construed Article 160 literally and
refused to allow alimony since the married persons had not been
living separate and apart for "a period of seven years" as required
by the terms of the article. The Chief Justice, in his concurring
opinion, pointed out the manner in which the legislature might
have amended Article 160 so that it would cover a divorce
granted on the basis of a statutory period of separation." Acting
on this suggestion, Article 160 was amended in 1934 so as to allow
alimony when the wife has not been at fault and where judgment of divorce is rendered against her on the ground that she
and her husband have been living apart "for a certain period
of time." 6 The result of the 1934 Act was to abrogate the rule
laid down in Blakely v. Magnon. It necessarily follows that under
the provisions of Act 430 of 1938, when divorce on the ground
of two years separation is granted against the wife not at fault,
alimony may be awarded to her under the present wording of
Article 160 of the Civil Code. It should also be noted that the
defendant wife, against whom a divorce has been obtained under
the statutory period divorce law, may even after the rendition
of the decree demand alimony from the husband by a separate
suit, provided that she has not been at fault. However, this
separate suit must be an ordinary suit and cannot be instituted
7
by rule to show cause.1
From a standpoint of policy, the 1938 Act in reducing the
statutory period to two years is open to criticism. It may be
argued that if no reconciliation has taken place within two years,
it is almost certain that none will take place in a longer period
of time, and that there is no good reason why the parties should
94. 180 La. 464, 156 So. 466 (1934).
95. Ibid. Chief Justice O'Niell (concurring): "if the Legislature, in
amending and re-enacting article 160 of the Civil Code, had merely referred
to the period of separation as the period necessary to entitle either party to
a divorce, instead of mentioning the 'period of seven years or more,' this
amendment of article 160 of the Code would have remained in effect when
Act No. 31 of 1932 was enacted, repealing Act No. 269 of 1916, and allowing
either spouse a divorce after a separation of four years. But the language of
the Act of 1928 was such as to allow alimony to a wife against whom a judgment of divorce was rendered only when the judgment was granted under the
provisions of Act No. 269 of 1916. Since that act has been repealed, there is
no law allowing alimony to a wife against whom a judgment of divorce has
been rendered .. ." (180 La. at 471, 156 So. at 468).

96. La. Act 27 of 1934 (2 E. S.).
97. Bienvenue v. Bienvenue, 186 La. 429, 172 So. 516 (1937).
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be forced to continue in a state of civil marriage. Yet at the
same time it should be recognized that the shortening of the
period may have definitely harmful consequences to society. Of
recent years there has been an alarmingly marked trend in the
legislatures of several states in the direction of facilitating divorce
as much as possible. It is to be hoped that Louisiana has not
joined this procession and will not follow the trend any further.
It should be recognized that the public policy of the State also
requires discouragement of divorce, and that the policy of the
law should be to effect, if humanly possible, a reconciliation
between the separated husband and wife. It is only where the
affection of the spouses has permanently ended that the courts
of this State should grant a final dissolution of the marriage. 8
Another statute which has a bearing on the subject of divorce
and alimony is Act 202 of 1938 which permits the substitution
of a special bond or mortgage in cases where an alimony judgment has been recorded in the mortgage records as a judicial
mortgage.9 9 The approval of the judge is required for this substitution but the act does not require any contradictory proceedings with the wife. This statute is designed to facilitate the
administration of property owned by a defendant against whom
an alimony judgment has been entered, and the necessity for obtaining the judge's approval of the substitution of the special bond
or mortgage should operate as a sufficient safeguard for the wife.
(c) Mineral Rights. There were three statutes of major importance affecting mineral rights: (1) declaring mineral leases
to be real rights, (2) authorizing the mortgage of mineral rights,
and (3) authorizing the pledge of rights to accrue under mineral
leases.
(1) Mineral leases declared to be real rights. The Louisiana
jurisprudence has consistently recognized a distinction between a
"mineral lease" and a "mineral servitude." A mineral lease creates a "personal right" in the lessee to reduce minerals to possession in accordance with the terms of the lease, while a mineral
servitude emanating from a grant or reservation of the minerals
creates a "real right." In either case there exists the right to
reduce the minerals to possession and ownership, but the differ98. Spansenberg v. Carter, 151 La. 1038, 1049, 92 So. 673, 677 (1922).
99. Although a judgment for alimony differs from money judgments in
many respects it has been held that the recording of an alimony judgment
obtained by a wife against her husband in a suit for separation from bed
and board or divorce creates a judicial mortgage, Baker v. Jewell, 114 La.
726, 38 So. 532 (1905).
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ence between a "mineral lease" and a "mineral servitude" becomes of extreme importance when action for the enforcement
or protection of the right is necessary.
In the celebrated recent case of Gulf Refining Company of
Louisiana v. Glassell,100 a lessee of an oil and gas lease filed a
petitory action against the defendants who had brought in a well
on certain property, alleging that they were trespassers on the
land, and claiming the exclusive right to the possession of the
land for the purpose of extracting the minerals therefrom. Exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action were filed by
the defendants on the grounds that the plaintiff, having alleged
that he was a lessee, did not have the right to institute a petitory
action, particularly where the lessor had not joined in it. The
exception was maintained in the court below, and on appeal the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision, holding that:
"The lessee in the usual mineral and oil lease based upon
a cash or royalty consideration, or both, merely obtains an
obligatory or personal right but not a real right-a jus in re.
Therefore he is in the same position as an ordinary lessee of
realty and is not entitled to institute a petitory action in his
own right....

"Oil and gas are fugitive minerals, and the owners of the
lands which contain such deposits are not the owners of the
oil and gas until they reduce these fugitive minerals to actual
possession. The owners of land have a real right in their
property to go upon it and explore it for these minerals, in
order to gain ownership thereof by securing possession of
them ....

They may sell this real right separate from the fee

of the realty, or reserve this real right when they sell the
land, and, in both instances, a real right in the land exists.
They may lease this right to a third person who obtains
thereby a personal right. ..

.

Though correctly decided under the existing law, it is clear
that the ruling of this case left a lessee of mineral rights without
an appropriate remedy to protect his rights, for the action in
damages which he may be able to institute against his lessor, 0 2
would in the majority of cases be insufficient to compensate him
fully for his loss in case of eviction. It is also doubtful whether
an evicted lessee with only a personal right could enjoin a tres100. 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
101. Id. at 198, 200, 171 So. at 849 (1936).
102. Art. 2696, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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passer, (though the court in the Glassell case intimates as much)
in view of the provisions of Article 298 of the Code of Practice'0 2
which require the plaintiff in such an action to be the possessor
0
as owner of real estate or of a real right for more than one year.'
Act 205 of 1938 was passed for the purpose of changing the
rule of the Glassell case. The statute reads:
"That oil, gas and other mineral leases, and contracts applying to and affecting such leases or the right to reduce
oil, gas or other minerals to possession, together with the
rights, privileges and obligations resulting or flowing therefrom, are hereby defined and classified as real rights and
incorporeal immovable property, and may be asserted, protected and defended in the same manner as may be the
ownership or possession of other immovable property by the
holder of such rights, without the concurrence, joinder or
consent of the landowner, and without impairment of rights
of warranty, in any action or by any procedure available to
the owner of immovable property or land."
By defining a mineral lease as a "real right," the 1938 Act brings
the right of the lessee (such as that in the Glassell case), within
the operation of the articles of the Code of Practice permitting
petitory actions. The act will place at rest the consternation
caused in the oil industry after the Glassell decision which, although entirely correct from a legal standpoint, was regarded
as undesirable. 10 5
(2) Mortgage of mineral rights authorized. Act 96 of 1938
provides:
"That mineral rights, which are defined for the purpose of
this Act to mean the right to the minerals in and under land,
or to a portion of the minerals, or to the minerals down to a
particular depth or stratum, or to one or more specific minerals, or a portion thereof, shall be subject to mortgage, as is
any corporeal immovable under the law of the State."
103. Art. 298, La. Code of Practice of 1870: "The injunction must be
granted, and directed against the defendant himself, in the following cases:
...
(5) When the defendant disturbs the plaintiff in the actual and real possession which such plaintiff has had for more than one year, either of a real
estate or of a real right, of which he claims either the ownership, the possession or the enjoyment." See also Churchill Farms, Inc. v. Gaudet, 184 La.
984, 168 So. 123 (1936) and authorities therein cited.
104. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. GlasselU, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846
(1936). See also Art. 2703, La. Civil Code of 1870.
105. La. Act 205 of 1938. The statute applies to transactions entered Into
before its passage.
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Independently of statute, mineral rights, whether acquired by
virtue of lease, purchase or reservation, were not susceptible of
being mortgaged; it made no difference whether the rights were
classed as personal rights or as real rights (servitudes).16 If a
mineral lease is regarded as giving the lessee merely a personal
right to explore for and reduce minerals to possession and ownership,1'0 it is obvious that such a right not being an immovable
could not be mortgaged. 10 8 If the mineral right is created by
grant or reservation and is consequently regarded as a servitude,
it likewise could not be the subject of mortgage in the absence
of a special statute. 10 9
The rapid development of the oil industry in Louisiana led
the Legislature in 1910 to pass a statute authorizing the mortgage of mineral leases and other "contracts under which the
right to develop and explore lands for the purpose of mining
for and securing oil, gas and other minerals" existed."1 0 It is
fairly obvious that the 1910 statute was not limited merely to
mineral leases and that the "other contracts" made subject to
mortgage included mineral servitudes created by grant or reservation.
To the extent that it authorizes the mortgage of mineral
servitudes, therefore, the 1938 statute"' does not change the early
106. Art. 3289, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The following objects alone are
susceptible of mortgage: (1) Immovables subject to alienation, and their accessories considered likewise as immovables; (2) The usufruct of the same
description of property with its accessories, during the time of its duration;
(3) Ships and other vessels."
107. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846
(1936).
108. Cf. Miller v. Michoud, 11 Rob. 225, 228 (La. 1845) rights under an
ordinary lease cannot be mortgaged, although a lease may be sold or transferred).
109. Art. 3289, La. Civil Code of 1870, is taken from Art. 2118, French
Civil Code. In France it is settled that servitudes cannot be mortgaged.
3 Aubry et Rau, Drolt Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1900) 202-204, no. 259; 2 BaudryLacantinerie et de Loyenes, Trait6 Th6orlque et Pratique de Droit Civil (3 ed.
1906) 37, no. 928; 12 Planlol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais,
(1928) 338, no. 364. An action for the recovery of an entire succession is
declared to be an immovable (Arts. 470, 471, La. Civil Code of 1870) but it is
not such an immovable as is susceptible of being mortgaged. Voorhies v.
DeBlanc, 12 La. Ann. 864 (1857). A servitude or real right is also an immovable, but only by reason of the object to which it applies (Arts. 462, 470, 471,
La. Civil Code of 1870) since "incorporeal things . . . are not of themselves
strictly susceptible of the quality of movables or immovables . . ." (Art. 470).
It is placed in the same category as "an action for the recovery of an immovable estate or an entire succession" (Art. 471) and therefore, in the light of
Voorhies v. DeBlanc, supra, it would not be susceptible of mortgage.
110, La. Act 232 of 1910 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 4731-4733] The act also
validated attempted prior mortgages on such rights.
111. La. Act 96 of 1938.
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law as laid down in the act of 1910. The statute does, however,
clear up any possible ambiguity in the 1910 Act and makes it
abundantly clear that all mineral rights may be mortgaged. The
1938 Act also adopts the view advanced in the Proposed Mineral
Code that mineral rights may include the right to all minerals,
or may be subdivided into the right to minerals down to a certain
depth or stratum, or to one or more specific minerals, or a portion
112
thereof.
One question of construction suggests itself. Does the term
"mineral rights" as used in Act 96 of 1938 include "mineral leases"?
In a broad sense it may be argued that since Act 205 of 1938
declares that mineral leases are real rights it was the intention
to include rights acquired under mineral leases within the scope
of the statute. On the other hand, the view may be advanced
that since Act 96 of 1938 was not to be effective in the event of
the passage of the Proposed Mineral Code, it must therefore
have been enacted with the distinction between mineral rights
and mineral leases contained in the proposed code.118 In any
event, however, mineral leases are susceptible to mortgage under
the provisions of the 1910 Act even if it were held that they are
not within the scope of the 1938 Act. A proper construction of the
1938 Act would seem to be that it was merely designed to explain
what the 1910 Act meant in authorizing the mortgage of "leases
or contracts." The 1938 Act is not in any way inconsistent with
or in conflict with any of the provisions of the Act of 1910 and,
therefore, does not have the effect of repealing it. On the other
hand, both being in pari materia, they should be construed together.
(3) Pledge of rights accruing or to accrue under mineral
leases or other contracts. Act 97 of 1938 authorizing the pledge of
rents, royalties and other rights accruing under mineral leases
and other contracts relating to minerals, is a recognition that the
particular nature of incorporeal rights accruing under mineral
contracts is such as to warrant special legislation. Act 95 of
1938 provides for the pledge of incorporeal rights not evidenced
by written instruments,"' and by Act 97 the Legislature prescribed the mode and manner of effecting a pledge of incorporeal
rights growing out of mineral contracts and mineral leases. The
procedure is different from the general method applicable to
112. See Art. 2, Proposed Mineral Code.
113. Arts. 11, 21, Proposed Mineral Code.
114. See discussion of Act 95 of 1938 at p. 108, infra.
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ordinary incorporeal rights as provided by Act 95 of 1938. Briefly,
it is provided that rents, royalties, over-riding royalties, bonuses
and other payments or rights accruing or to accrue under mineral
leases and other contracts relating to minerals shall be pledged
in the same manner as other property, but that no delivery need
be made to the pledgee of the rights so pledged. In order to be
effective as against third persons, the pledge shall be recorded
in the mortgage records of the parish wherein the land, on which
the lease or contract exists, is sftuated. For the protection of the
pledgee and obligor of the rents, royalties or other rights, it is
provided that notice be given to the obligor thereof, either by
ilelivery of a copy of the act of pledge or by having him acknowledge the pledge in question. The act of pledge may be
by authentic act but an act under private signature will suffice.11
Since the property in question is to be pledged "in the same
manner as other property" it would appear necessary that the act
of pledge contain a statement of the amount of the debt to be
secured and an adequate description of the thing given in
pledge. 1 ' Thus the pledge of mineral rights (referred to in the
statute) is made in the same manner as the pledge of incorporeal
property not evidenced by a written instrument, except that the
former must be recorded in the mortgage records in order to be
1 17
effective as against third persons.
In connection with the foregoing legislation on minerals and
mineral rights, it is also worthy of note that the Legislature,
with the view of further fostering the development of the oil
industry, has authorized State educational institutions of higher
learning to execute mineral leases upon lands owned, administered or controlled by them. 1 8 It has also been provided that
whenever land situated in any spillway or floodway is sold to,
or is acquired by, the United States or the State of Louisiana or
any political subdivisions thereof, for the use and construction
of spillways, and the original owner reserves or retains the mineral rights in the said land, these rights shall be imprescriptible." 9
Supplementing this latter provision is the act providing that,
whenever the United States or the State of Louisiana or any
political subdivisions thereof acquire property from any person
115.
116.
117.
infra.
118.
119.

La. Act 97 of 1938, § 1.
Art 3158, La. Civil Code of 1870.
For a discussion of the pledge of incorporeal rights see pp. 106-110,
La. Act 130 of 1938.
La. Act 68 of 1938.
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for use in any public work, prescription shall not run against any
1 20
reserved mineral rights.

(d) Pledge of claims, credits, obligations and incorporeal
rights not evidenced by written instruments. Under the Civil
Code of 1825, in order that a pledge of movable property, whether
corporeal or. incorporeal, be valid as against third persons, it
had to be made by an authentic act or by an act under private
signature properly registered in the office of a notary public. 12'
If the incorporeal property pledged consisted of non-negotiable
instruments, it was also necessary that a copy of the act of
pledge be served upon the debtor. 2 2 If, however, the instrument
pledged was payable to bearer or to order, then notice to the
debtor was dispensed with, it being necessary in such case for the
pledgor to endorse the instrument. 2 In 1852 and in 1855 special
legislation was passed relative to the formalities necessary for a
valid pledge as against third parties, of promissory notes, bills
of exchange, stocks, obligations or claims upon third persons. The
only formality required by these statutes was the delivery of the
notes or other evidence of claims to the pledgee thereof; in case
these instruments were non-negotiable, the additional formality
of notice to the debtor was required.124 For the pledge of other
movable property an act of pledge was required, but it did not
have to be by authentic act."25 In the Civil Code of 1870 this
legislation was incorporated with the previous article of the
Civil Code of 1825 so as to read as follows:
Art. 3158. "But this privilege shall take place against third
persons, only in case the pawn is proved by an act made either
in a public form or under private signature; provided such
act has been recorded in the manner required by law; provided also that whatever may be in the form of the act, it
mentions the amount of the debt, as well as the species and
120. La. Act 151 of 1938.
121. Arts. 3121-3127, La. Civil Code of 1825; Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart.
(O.S.) 570 (La. 1815); Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 569, 16 Am. Dec.
212 (La. 1827).
122. Art. 3127, La. Civil Code of 1825.
123. Art. 3128, La. Civil Code of 1825; Sewall v. McNeill, 17 La. 185 (1841);
Robinson v. Shelton, 2 Rob. 277 (La. 1842); Fluker v. Bullard, 2 La. Ann. 338
(1847).
124. La. Act 25 of 1852; La. Act 287 of 1855 was identical with the 1852
Act except that it contained a clause (§ 5) repealing "All laws contrary to the
provisions of this Act and all laws upon the same subject matter, except what
is contained in the Civil Code and Code of Practice . . ."
125. Under the 1855 Act, delivery of property In a warehouse was made
by delivery of the warehouse receipt.
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nature of the thing given in pledge, or as a statement
annexed
126
thereto of its number, weight and measure.

"When a debtor wishes to pawn promissory notes, bills of
exchange, stocks, obligations or claims upon other persons,
he shall deliver to the creditors, the notes, bills of exchange,
certificates of stock or other evidences of the claims or rights
so pawned; and such pawn so made, without further formalities, shall be valid as well against third persons as against
the pledgors thereof, if made in good faith. 127
"All pledges of movable property may be made by private
writing, accompanied by actual delivery; and the delivery of
property on deposit in a warehouse shall pass by the private
assignment of the warehouse receipt, so as to authorize the
owner to pledge such property; and such pledge, so made,
without further formalities, shall be valid as well against
third persons as against the pledgors thereof, if made in good
faith. 12 8
"If a credit not negotiable be given in pledge, notice of
12 9
the same must be given to the debtor.'

It can readily be seen that there was conflict between the several provisions of the new article in the Civil Code of 1870. The
first paragraph required all pledges to be by authentic act or act
under private signature duly recorded, while the second, third
and fourth paragraphs abolished the necessity of authentic acts
in the pledge of corporeal movables and of the act of pledge
in the case of incorporeal rights.3 0 This conflict was resolved
by an amendment and re-enactment of the article in 1900 which
struck out the requirement of an authentic act or acts under
private signature from the first paragraph of Article 3158.131
126. This paragraph, with minor changes, is the same as Art. 3125, La.
Civil Code of 1825.
127. This paragraph came from La. Act 287 of 1855, § 1.
128. This paragraph came from La. Act 287 of 1855, § 2.
129. This paragraph came from La. Act 287 of 1855, § 3.
130. See Carter v. Merrell & Co., 14 La. Ann. 375, 377 (1859). In Casey v.
Cavaroc, 96 U.S. 496, 24 L. Ed. 790 (1877) it was held that mere delivery of
promissory notes is sufficient to constitute a valid pledge of them despite any
provisions of Article 3158.
131. La. Act 157 of 1900, amending Art. 3158, La. Civil Code of 1870. The
Legislature failed to amend Art. 3156 of the La. Civil Code of 1870 to bring it
into harmony with the new language of Art. 3158 with the result that the
provisions of the former article still erroneously imply that a formal act of
pledge is necessary to perfect the pledge of incorporeal property. (Art. 3156,
La. Civil Code of 1870, "When a debtor wishes to pawn a claim on another
person, he must make a transfer of it in the act of pledge, and deliver . .
(Italics supplied).
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In order to understand properly the effect of Act 95 of 1938
which provides for the pledge of claims, credits and incorporeal
rights not evidenced by written instrument or muniment of title,
it is necessary, in addition to the foregoing historical analysis of
Article 3158, to consider other legal principles applicable to the
pledge of movables and incorporeal rights. 13 2 While all movables
may be pledged, it is absolutely essential in order to have a
valid pledge as against third persons that delivery of the property
to the pledgee or to someone for him be made. 133 When the thing
to be pledged consists of incorporeal property or rights, such as
credits and other claims, the delivery is merely fictitious and
symbolical, delivery of the evidence of the obligation being sufficient; but here also such a delivery is essential and no valid pledge
will result without it.'34 If a non-negotiable credit is pledged, notice to the debtor is required. 135
There are some incorporeal rights, such as rights acquired
under leases or mortgages, delivery of which is impractical if not
impossible. For example, where an attempt was made by a recorded notarial agreement, to pledge rights under a lease, it
was held that there had been no delivery either actual or symbolical and that the pledge had not been perfected. 136 The court
held that the bare agreement of the parties to the pledge did
not amount to a delivery but a proper delivery might have been
132. The contract of pledge Is one by which a debtor gives something
to his creditor as security for his debt, and a pledge may be made of immovable property as well as of movables, the former being known as antichresis
and the latter being referred to as pawn, Arts. 3133-3135, La. Civil Code of
1870. The contract of antichresis is now of very little use, so that when we
talk of pledge we mean the giving of movables as security for debt. See
Harang v. Ragan, 134 La. 201, 63 So. 875 (1914) (antichresis referred to as an
antiquated contract); but cf. Gautreaux v. Harang, La. , 183 So. 349
(1938).
133. Arts. 3152, 3162, La. Civil Code of 1870. Donoven v. Herman, 122 La.
458, 47 So. 769 (1908); Mechanics Bank of McComb v. Van Zant, 144 La. 685,
81 So. 251 (1919); Smith Bros. & Co. v. Richheimer & Co., 145 La. 1066, 83 So.
255 (1919).
134. Art. 3156, La. Civil Code of 1870. Lallande v. Ingram, 19 La. Ann. 364
(1867); Merchants' & Farmers Bk. & Tr. Co. v. First State Bank & Tr. Co., 123
So. 401 (La. App. 1929).
"If the pledge of movables could, without delivery have effect in regard
to third persons, it would be the source of great fraud and deceptions. When
the debtor is obliged to surrender possession he cannot deceive third parties
dealing with him by keeping possession of the pledged articles, as part of his
estate, and getting credit thereby .. ." Citizens Bank v. Janin, 46 La. Ann. 995,
1002, 15 So. 471, 472-3 (1894). See also Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U.S. 496, 24 L.Ed.
790 (1877).
135. Art. 3160, La. Civil Code of 1870. Foote v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of
Canada, 173 So. 477, 481 (La. App. 1937).
136. Cafftin v. Kirwan, 7 La. Ann. 221 (1852).
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effected by an instrument in the form of a sale. A similar result
was obtained in a case in which the rights attempted to be
pledged consisted of a mortgage and vendor's privilege on property.'3 7 According to these authorities such rights are insusceptible of delivery and an additional agreement in the form of a
sale or transfer is necessary. Such a sale or transfer will be
regarded as a pledge when it appears that the intention of the
parties was to secure an existing debt and not the transfer of the
property outright. 138
For similar reasons, incorporeal rights which are not evidenced by written instruments such as rent claims not evidenced
by rent notes, mortgage indebtedness not evidenced by mortgage
notes, and the like, are not susceptible of delivery, and consequently cannot be pledged in the absence of an additional sale
or transfer as above indicated.
It was probably with this situation in mind that the Legislature enacted Act 95 of 1938, which provides:
"That claims, credits, obligations and incorporeal rights in
general [not] 19 evidenced by written instrument or muniment
of title, shall be subject to pledge, and may be pledged in the
same manner as other property under the law of the State,
provided that the same shall be valid as to all persons without
delivery of such claim, credit, obligation or incorporeal right
to the pledgee of any kind, except that to obligate the obligor
thereof to pay the amount due thereunder to the pledgee,
notice of the pledge must be given in writing to the obligor
or must be acknowledged in writing by the obligor."
The main effect of the 1938 Act, therefore, is to eliminate the
requirement of delivery for the pledge of such incorporeal rights
as are not evidenced by written instrument or muniment of title.
Such credits "may be pledged in the same manner as other
property under the law of the State." The term "other property"
is not entirely clear but probably must be taken to refer to cor137. Sevin & Gourdain v. Caillouet, 30 La. Ann. 528 (1878).
138. Wolf v. Wolf, 12 La. Ann. 529 (1857); Calderwood v. Calderwood, 23
La. Ann. 658 (1871); Ware v. Morris, 23 La. Ann. 665 (1871) (an absolute deed
will be construed as a mortgage where such was the intention of the parties.)
139. The omission of the word "not" before the phrase "evidenced by
written instrument or muniment of title" is undoubtedly a printer's error
because in the Act as promulgated on July 9, 1938 this error was not present.
Baton Rouge State-Times, July 9, 1938, p. 15 B. The title contains the word
"not" and had there been oversight on the part of the Legislature in this
omission In the body of the Act, the statute would probably have been unconstitutional as the title would not be indicative of the object of the act.
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poreal movables, for which an act of pledge is necessary. 140 It
appears, therefore, that in order to pledge incorporeal rights
which are not evidenced by a written instrument, it is necessary
to enter into an act of pledge in which shall be stated the amount
of the debt as well as the nature of the right given in pledge,
just as in the case of corporeal property.' As a result of the 1938
Act, therefore, it is submitted that the formalities requisite for
the pledge of corporeal and incorporeal property may now be
summarized as follows:
1. The pledge of corporeal property must be made by an act of
pledge containing the amount of the debt to be secured, and
an adequate description of the property given in pledge, in
14 2
addition to actual delivery of the thing pledged.
2. Incorporeal rights evidenced by written instruments such as
promissory notes, bills of exchange, and the like are pledged
by delivery only, no act of pledge being necessary, and should
these rights be contained in instruments not negotiable, notice
to the debtor thereof is necessary. 4 8
3. Incorporeal rights not evidenced by written instruments may
be pledged by act of pledge in which shall be stated the amount
of the debt to be secured and an adequate description of the
right pledged. No delivery of the right is necessary, for, none
4
can be made, there being no written evidence thereof.
(e) Sales. Three statutes of interest in connection with the
subject matter of sales are: (1) the act authorizing private sale
of succession property, (2) the statute dealing with sheriff's sales
&la folle ench~re, and (3) the act dealing with covenants running
with the land established in sales of immovable property.
(1) Private sale of succession property authorized. Prior to
the adoption of Act 290 of 1938, executors and administrators
could not sell succession property at private sale to pay debts or
legacies, but, subject to two exceptions, all sales had to be at
140. Since under existing law incorporeal rights may be pledged by mere
delivery of the evidence of the obligation, without writing and without a formal act of pledge, the term "other property" as used In Act 95 of 1938 cannot
refer to such incorporeal property evidenced by written instruments. Such
a construction would be contradicting the terms of the statute which specifically provides that no delivery is necessary.
141. Art. 3158, La. Civil Code of 1870 discussed supra p. 106.
142. Art. 3158, La. Civil Code of 1870.
143. Art. 3158, La. Civil Code of 1870.
144. La. Act 95 of 1938.
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public auction under pain of nullity. 145 The two exceptions were:

(1) stocks and bonds could be sold at private sale at current rates
under proper order of court; 1 46 and (2) dations en paiement of

mortgaged property to mortgage creditors were permitted in cases
was greater than the
in which the balance due to the mortgagee
47
value of the property mortgaged."

The restriction against private sales of succession property,
coupled with the rule that movables had to be sold before immovables,' 8 undoubtedly hindered the efficient administration
and liquidation of a decedent's estate; it was to modify such
restriction and to give executors and administrators similar powers to those possessed by other fiduciaries over the property under
their administration, that Act 290 of 1938 was passed. The procedure to effect a private sale of succession is by petition filed in
court, followed by publication of notice requiring parties in interest to show cause why such sale should not be effected. Upon
compliance with the provisions of the new Act the judge may
authorize the private sale. A second change in the law made by
this statute is the provision in Section 2 authorizing the sale of
immovables before movables if it is to the advantage of the
estate." '
(2) Sale a la folle ench&re authorized in judicial sales in Orleans Parish. Article 2611 of the Civil Code provides that in sales
at public auction, if the bidder does not comply with the terms
of his bid, the thing may be sold again at public auction and if a
smaller price is obtained the adjudicatee of the first sale shall be
liable for the deficiency. This second sale, after a "fool's bid,"
at the risk of the first bidder is known as a "sale a la folle enchore." It is well settled that this has no application to a sheriff's
sale in execution.1 0 In such cases Article 689 of the Code of
Practice applies and on the second sale the first purchaser is not
liable for the difference between his bid and the amount realized
on the second sale.' 5 ' In 1908, the Legislature passed a statute
145. Heirs of Burney v. Ludeling, 47 La. Ann. 73, 94, 16 So. 507, 515 (1895).
146. La. Act 21 of 1890 as amended by La. Act 246 of 1918 [Dart's Stats.
(1932) § 9705].
147. La. Act 121 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1937) §§ 9734.1-9734.2].
148. Arts. 1062, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1668, La. Civil Code of 1870.
149. The passage of this Act was advocated by Professor Leon Sarpy of
Loyola University School of Law. The proposed statute with a full discussion
of the reasons for it are contained in Sarpy, Proposed Private Sale of Succession Assets (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 412.
150. Gallier v. Garcia, 2 Rob. 319 (La. 1842); Roussell v. Hughes, 159 La.
864, 106 So. 332 (1925).
151. Roussell v. Hughes, 159 La. 864, 106 So. 332 (1925).
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regulating the manner in which judicial sales should be made in
parishes containing over 200,000 inhabitants," 2 and specifically
provided that the second sale should be made at the risk of the
former purchaser so that such sales were made a la folle enchore. 58 But this statute in its entirety was repealed by Act
179 of 1936.
Under the provisions of Act 74 of 1938 regulating sheriff's
sales, the 1908 statute is revived in exactly the same language as
the original, with the exception that the new Act is made to apply
to parishes containing 400,000 inhabitants. In other words, it is
designed to apply to the Parish of Orleans with the result that
such sales in that parish may be made e la folle ench~re. In the
other parishes the rule remains as stated above.
(3) Prescriptionestablished for actions to enjoin, or to obtain
damages for, violation of restrictions contained in land titles.
Act 326 of 1938 provides:
"Section 1.... That all actions to enjoin, or to obtain damages for the commission, or continuance, of a violation of restrictions contained in the title to land, where otherwise such
action presently exists under the laws of this State, must be
brought within two years from the commission of said violation; provided, that where a violation of restrictions has actually existed for a period of two years prior to the passage of
this Act any action to enjoin the same, or to obtain damages
therefor, if such action presently exists under the laws of this
State, must be brought within four months from, and after,
the effective date of this Act.
"Section 2. That in all cases where the prescription provided for by this Act shall have accrued, the particular parcel
of land on which the restriction has been violated shall be
forever free from the restriction which has been violated."
In connection with this statute the present status of the Louisiana
law regarding conditions and restrictions imposed upon the title
to real estate should be considered. The validity of such conditions and restrictions, provided they are not perpetual, has been
sustained by the Supreme Court in virtue of the owner's power
to dispose of his property in the "most unlimited manner. ' 'P 54
152. La. Act 316 of 1908 (Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 9021-9025].
153. For cases applying the statute see Orleans Homestead Association v.
Williams, 171 La. 336, 131 So. 39 (1930); Pontchartrain Realty Co. v. Passera,
172 La. 243, 133 So. 761 (1931).
154. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641, L.R.A.
1916B, 1201; Ann. Cas. 1916D 1248 (1915); Art. 491, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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Since ownership may be dismembered into (1) the right to use
(the usus), (2) the right to enjoy (the fructus), and (3) the
right to dispose (the abusus), it follows that an owner may impose a restriction prohibiting the purchaser from using the property except for a given purpose, or prohibiting the building of
certain structures, or restricting the right to alienate to certain
persons. 15 5 Where such restrictions are imposed, absolute ownership is not transferred, the seller keeps in himself a part of that
ownership with the result that the buyer cannot "own" the property as if he had bought without restrictions.
Whether a restriction can have the character of a resolutory
condition depends upon the particular circumstances of each
case, 158 but the resolutory action will not lie where an injunction
would give adequate relief.'57 However, when a right of resolution does exist, a purchaser might acquire full ownership free of
the restriction by the ten year prescription acquirendi causa if
the requisites of the law were met. 158 Thus if an injunction were
directed against a third person, it would have to be brought before
such acquisitive prescription had run, otherwise the right to enforce the restriction would be lost. Subject, however, to the possibility of waiver or laches in cases where restrictions were violated it would seem that the action to prevent violation of such
restriction would not be prescribed before the lapse of ten years.
Act 326 of 1938 now provides a statutory prescriptive period
of two years from the commission of the violation within which
"actions to enjoin or to obtain damages" must be brought, or the
land "shall be forever free from the restriction which has been
violated." The act provides for the prescription of all actions to
enjoin or to obtain damages but nothing is said regarding actions
to resolve a sale where the restriction is resolutory in character.
Is the prescriptive period of two years applicable to cases of reso155. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915);
Hill v. Win. Ross, Inc., 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928).
156. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915)
(sale of land with restriction not to resell to a negro).
157. Cf. Hill v. Win. Ross, Inc., 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928); Art. 1929,
La. Civil Code of 1870. If the restriction is one limiting the right to build to a
certain kind of structure it seems that an injunction would be a sufficiently
adequate remedy.
158. Art. 3479, La. Civil Code of 1870. This particular question has never
been squarely presented to our courts for decision but it is submitted that
after ten years from the breach of the restriction it is not enforceable. See
Palmer Corp. of La. v. Moore, 171 La. 774, 132 So. 229 (1930) (land freed from
mineral reservation by prescription acquirendi causa). Sample v. Whitaker,
171 La. 949, 182 So. 511 (1930); 174 La. 245, 140 So. 36 (1932).
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lution? Does the provision that the property shall be forever free
from such restriction include freedom from the resolutory action?
Suppose A sells land to B with the restriction that the purchaser,
his heirs and assigns shall not sell to a negro. B sells to C, a negro,
in violation of the restriction and more than two years elapse
from such sale, may A still resolve the sale?
It would seem that the statute should be construed strictly
and its application limited to cases in which injunction or damages are sought and not to include cases of resolution. Under the
language of the statute the land is free from the restrictions "in
all cases in which the prescription provided for in this act shall
have accrued." But it appears from Section 1 that the only prescription provided is for actions to enjoin or to recover damages,
so that in the hypothetical case above it is probable that the
action for resolution would still lie. If, on the other hand, the
Legislature intended that all restrictions in title to land, regardless of their nature, should not be enforceable after the period
prescribed by the Act, it seems to have failed in the accomplishment of this objective with regard to resolutory conditions.
This legislation was evidently enacted for the purpose of protecting the present owners of property in cases where restrictions
have been violated. In this respect it will have the effect of
settling a number of the legal questions which are now entirely
uncertain due to the dearth of authorities dealing with restrictions
in Louisiana. However, the statute will also have the effect of
making it increasingly difficult to maintain plans of development
in residential subdivisions.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Of the twenty-eight constitutional amendments proposed, and
ratified by the people in the November election, the majority relate to local matters, political subdivisions, fiscal matters of the
state, and taxes or bond issues. The following constitutional
amendments are of sufficient interest to merit special mention.
(a) Homestead Exemption. Act 42 of 1938, adopted as a
constitutional amendment to the provisions governing the homestead exemption, raises the amount of the exemption from
$2,000.00 "to the total value of not more than Four Thousand
Dollars ($4,000.00)."151 There is also inserted the affirmative pro159. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XI, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, as amended in accordance
with the proposal in La. Act 42 of 1938.
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vision that "if the sale does not realize more than that sum, over
and above all costs and expenses, said sale shall be null and
void"--this however was implied in the earlier sections. 160 The
1938 amendment deletes from Section 1 of Article XI, the whole
of paragraph 3, which provided: "From the benefit of homesteads
allowed to the husband there shall be deducted the value of
property or means owned and enjoyed by the wife." It is well
settled that other property of the claimant need not be deducted
from the amount allowed as a homestead exemption, 1 ' so that in
virtue of the present constitutional amendment
this rule would
16 2
claimant.
is
wife
the
where
even
apply
Under the Constitution of 1921, Section 2 of Article XI enumerated five classes of debts to which the homestead exemption did
not apply. 63 The 1938 amendment adds two additional classes as
follows:
"6. For the amount which may be due a homestead or
building and loan association for a loan made by it on the
security of the property; provided, that if at the time of making such loan the borrower be married, and not separated from
bed and board from the other spouse, the latter shall have
consented thereto.
"7. For the amount which may be due for money advanced
on the security of a mortgage on said property; provided, that
if at the time of granting such mortgage the mortgagor be
married, and not separated from bed and board from the other
spouse, the latter shall have consented thereto."
These additional exceptions would apply in situations where there
is no express waiver of homestead exemption and which would
not otherwise fall within the previous classes of exceptions.'"
160. See Lee v. Cooper, 155 La. 142, 98 So. 869 (1924) (beneficiary has
right to prevent seizure and sale of the homestead exemption unless for a sum
exceeding $2,000.00).
161. Abramson v. Larabie, 140 La. 825, 74 So. 162 (1917); Succession of
Harrington, 152 La. 927, 94 So. 447 (1922).
162. See Succession of White, 170 La. 403, 127 So. 883 (1930); Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Slagle, 184 La. 556, 166 So. 673 (1936). The result of the Prudential

Insurance case would be different under the 1938 amendment.
163. "This exemption shall not apply to the following debts, to-wit: (1)
For the purchase price of property or any part of such purchase price; (2)
For labor, money and material, furnished for building, repairing or improving
homesteads; (3) For liabilities incurred by any public officer, or fiduciary, or
any attorney at law, for money collected or received on deposit; (4) For
taxes and assessments, and (5) For rent which bears a privilege upon said
Property." La. Const. of 1921, Art. XI, § 2.

164. Waiver of homestead exemption was authorized in La. Const. of
1921, Art. XI, § 3, and this provision is also carried over into the 1938 amendment.
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Registration of the homestead exemption was previously required only in the Parish of Orleans. 16 The 1938 Amendment
requires such recordation where the property is situated in a
city having a population of more than one hundred thousand.166
167
The manner of recordation is that provided under existing law.
(b) City Judges made ex-Oficio Judges of Juvenile Courts.
The constitutional amendment adopted pursuant to Act 198 of
1938 adds two paragraphs to Section 52 of Article VII of the
Constitution of 1921 relative to juvenile courts, as follows:
"In ward or wards wherein there exists a City Court created under the provisions of Section 51 of Article VII of this
Constitution, the judge of said City Court shall be ex-officio
judge of the Juvenile Court within his jurisdiction. Said City
Judge shall have jurisdiction concurrent with that of the District Court and shall have all the powers now conferred on
judges of the District Court as judges of the Juvenile Court.
In addition to the compensation now paid judges of City Courts
by their respective municipality and parish, said judges shall
each receive a salary of Twelve Hundred Dollars per annum
from the State, payable monthly on their own warrant.
"The sessions of said court shall be held apart from all
sessions of the City Court, and its records shall be kept separately. The Court may sit in chambers, and may hold its
sessions irrespective of terms of court."
The status of the district judges as ex-officio judges of the juvenile
courts is not affected by the amendment and the jurisdiction of
the juvenile courts remains the same as it was prior to the 1938
amendment.0 8 The amendment likewise has no application to
the Parish of Orleans. 16 9 Matters within the jurisdiction of a
city judge acting as ex-officio judge of the juvenile court will be
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 1 0
(c) Retirement of Judges and DistrictAttorneys. A complete
revision of the provisions relative to the retirement of judges was
165. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XI, § 4.
166. This would include only the City of New Orleans. According to the
figures for 1935 the City of Shreveport had a population of 76,655.
167. La. Act 114 of 1880; La. Act 35 of 1921 [Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 38053809].
168. La. Act 324 of 1936, adopted as a constitutional amendment Nov.
3, 1936.
169. See La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 96.
170. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 54.
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effected by constitutional amendment. 171 The Constitution of 1921,
as amended in 1928 and 1936, provided merely for the retirement
of "any judge of the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, or District
Courts. ' ' 1 72 Under the 1938 amendment the retirement provisions
are made to include specifically, the judges of the Court of Appeal
for the Parish of Orleans, of the Civil and Criminal District Courts
for the Parish of Orleans, of juvenile courts and of city courts of
record. The previous constitutional provisions authorized voluntary retirement on two-thirds pay at the age of seventy after
twenty years of continuous service. The amended provision allows voluntary retirement at two-thirds pay at the age of sixtyfive after twenty years of continuous service or at the age of
seventy after fifteen years of such service. After twenty-three
years of service, any judge of a court of record may retire on
two-thirds pay, irrespective of his age.
The Constitution of 1921 made retirement compulsory at the
age of seventy-five, but in 1936 this was increased to eighty years.
The 1938 amendment likewise fixes eighty as the age for compulsory retirement but provides for full pay for life instead of twothirds pay, provided, of course, that the judge has served. continuously as judge of a court of record for twenty years.
Under the previous provision, a justice of the Supreme Court
who might become physically or mentally incapacitated to perform his duties could be retired on two-thirds pay. Such retirement has been broadened by the amendment to include all judges
of courts of record. In the case of a judge of the Supreme Court,
Courts of Appeal and the Civil and Criminal District Courts for
the Parish of Orleans, such disability must be made to appear by
a certificate from a majority of the remaining members of the
court.1 75 In the case of a district judge, a juvenile judge, or a judge
of a city court of record, the certificate of disability is to be approved by a majority of the Supreme Court. The previous constitutional provision is also broadened so as to make it clear that
the retirement salary is to be provided by and paid from the same
sources from which the judge was compensated at the time of his
retirement.
An additional retirement provision incorporated into the Con171. La. Act 383 of 1938, adopted as a constitutional amendment to La.
Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 8.
172. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 8, as amended in accordance with the
proposals in La. Act 139 of 1928, and La. Act 321 of 1936.
173. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 8, par. 3, as amended in accordance
with the proposal in'La. Act 383 of 1938.
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stitution was that authorizing voluntary retirement on full pay of
any District Attorney who has reached the age of eighty years and
has served continuously for thirty years as district attorney.1 '
(d) Prescriptive period established for all taxes and licenses,
other than real property taxes. Under the present provisions of
the Constitution, privileges or tax liens for state, parish and municipal taxes lapse in three years from the 31st day of December
of the year in which the taxes are due, whether such tax liens or
privileges are recorded or not. Prior to the Constitution of 1921,
Act 146 of 1906 and Act 198 of 1914 established a prescriptive period of three years for license taxes. In the case of State v. Standard Oil Company of Louisiana,7" it was held that as a result of
the adoption of a specific provision in the Constitution of 1921 authorizing the legislature to impose a severance tax on natural resources, the three-year prescriptive period under the earlier statutes was inapplicable and consequently the general rule that prescription did not run against the State would be applied.176 The
decision caused consternation among major taxpayers throughout
the State who were faced with the possibility of numerous suits
based on differing interpretations of various revenue provisions.
In accordance with the current administration policy of encouraging industry, there was established by constitutional amendment a three-year prescriptive period that would be applicable
to all taxes and licenses. The amendment adds, to the first paragraph of Section 19 of Article XIX of the Constitution, the following:
"... and provided, further, that all taxes and licenses, other
than real property taxes, shall prescribe in three years from
the 31st day of December in the year in which such taxes or
177
licenses are due.'
The establishment of this three-year prescriptive period will
safeguard taxpayers in instances where administrative officials
have placed an interpretation on a license or excise tax statute,
and such interpretation has been acted upon for a number of
years.
174. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 59.1 as added by the proposal in La.
Act 200 of 1938. It was generally considered in the Legislature that this
amendment was designed to cover one specific case. It is unlikely that many
district attorneys will meet the qualifications that are laid down for retirement.
175. 188 La. 978, 178 So. 601 (1938).
176. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIX, § 16.
177. La. Act 35 of 1938, adopted as a Constitutional Amendment Nov. 8,

1938.
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(e) Exemptions from taxation. (1) New manufacturing establishments. By constitutional amendment adopted in 1936178
the Governor, or the State Board of Commerce and Industry with
the approval of the Governor, was authorized to contract with the
owners of new industries to be established in the State for exemption from ad valorem taxation for a term not exceeding ten years
in accordance with the best interests of the State. The 1938 constitutional amendment 7 9 re-enacts the main features of the previous provision with the following changes: (a) contracts are to
be entered into by the State Board of Commerce and Industry
with the approval of the Governor; (b) such contracts may be entered into only "during the period of three years after this amendment takes effect"; and (c) the term "manufacturing establishment" is substituted for "industry" with a definition of "manufacturing establishment" incorporated into the Constitution as
follows:
"The term 'manufacturing establishment', as used in this
paragraph means a plant or establishment which engages in
the business of working raw materials into wares suitable for
use, or which gives new shapes, new qualities, or new combinations to matter which has already gone through some artificial
process."
The effect of the amendment is to narrow the class of enterprises
entitled to come within the exemption and also to limit the application of the exemption to the period between November 1938 and
November 1941.
(2) New Homes. An additional paragraph has been added to
the constitutional provisions regarding exemptions from ad valorem taxation so as to exempt from all taxes 80 for a period of three
years after completion "new homes or improvements built, made
or purchased, after January 1, 1938." The improvements must
be built upon the bona fide homestead of a head of a family and
the exemption shall extend to the surviving spouse or minor child
or children. It is provided that the exemption shall not apply unless the prevailing wage rate in the locality shall have been paid
in the construction of the new home or improvements. Authority
178.
Art. X,
179.
1938.
180.
1938.

La. Act 68 of 1936, adopted as an amendment to La. Const. of 1921,
§ 4, Nov. 3, 1936.
La. Act 37 of 1938, adopted as a Constitutional Amendment Nov. 8,
La. Act 38 of 1938, adopted as a Constitutional Amendment Nov. 8,
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is vested in the Louisiana Tax Commission to determine facts with
reference to said exemption.
Miscellaneous tax exemptions. Additional provisions have
been incorporated into the ad valorem tax exemption so as to include within the exemption bridges hereafter built across the
182
Mississippi River 18 1 and boats using gasoline as motor fuel.
III. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
Attorneys. Prior to 1938, attorneys appointed to assist in the
collection of inheritance taxes were entitled to a fee of four per
cent on all taxes collected on amounts up to $150,000 and two
per cent on amounts in excess thereof; no provision was made
for a fee in cases where no inheritance tax was due. 8 ' The inheritance tax law has been amended to provide that, in all cases where
the gross value of the succession is $1,500.00 or more and in which
no tax is due, the attorney for the inheritance tax collector shall
receive for his services a fee of $5.00 to be paid out of the assets
84
of the succession.
Attorney of record may be served with process. Act 120 of
1938 which provides for the service of process in civil suits upon
any attorney of record in said suits is of great practical importance to the members of the bar. It is elementary that service of
citation and all other legal process, if addressed to an individual,
may be made by handing same to him personally'8" or by domiciliary service.' 8" Prior to the passage of Act 120 of 1938, after a
suit had been brought, service of all other process in the suit, including supplemental petitions, except garnishment process, could
be made upon the attorney of record, and this right remained until the attorney had formally withdrawn from the case under order of court. 18 7 The process in question must be directed against

the party litigant, though the service may be made upon and accepted by the counsel of record. 8 8 Process issuing out of one suit
181. La. Act 41 of 1938, adopted as a Constitutional Amendment Nov. 8,
1938.
182. The purpose of this exemption being to offset gasoline taxes paid by
owners of boats using gasoline for motor fuel. La. Act 199 of 1938, adopted as
a Constitutional Amendment, Nov. 8, 1938.
183. La. Act 127 of 1921 (E.S.) § 22 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 8577].
184. La. Act 85 of 1938, amending La. Act 127 of 1921 (E.S.) § 22.
185. La. Act 179 of 1918, § 1 (1) (Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1933 (1)].
186. La. Act 179 of 1918, § 1 (9) [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1933 (9)]; Art. 253,
La. Code of Practice of 1870.
187. La. Act 179 of 1918 § 1 (16) [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1933 (16)].
188. Commercial Nat'l Bk. v. Smith, 150 La. 234, 90 So. 581 (1922).
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cannot be made upon the counsel of record representing the same
party in another suit. 189
In the case of Adams v. Ross Amusement Co., 190 Ross and
Shannon intervened claiming ownership of the defendant's property which had been attached, and prayed for a dissolution of the
attachment. The plaintiff then filed a supplemental petition alleging that the intervenors were partners doing business as the Ross
Amusement Company, and the petition was served on the intervenors' attorney of record. In holding the service of the supplemental petition to be bad, the court said:
"This mode of service of citation, is authorized on the theory that the attorney of the party in a suit is his representative and agent in all legal matters connected therewith. We
think that service could have been made on Shannon and Ross
through their attorneys of record of any process in connection
with or incidental to their intervention. But the mode of service provided for in subsection 16, being in derogation of the
general law with reference to the regular methods authorized,
the new method should be limited to cases clearly provided for
in the statute." 19'
It was no doubt to overturn this decision that the Legislature
passed Act 120 of 1938 which provides that service of all other
process upon intervenors, third opponents, or any other party
to any suit, may be made upon the attorneys of record for the
respective parties. The act specifically provides:
" . . . That after any civil suit has been brought and the
defendant or other parties have appeared through counsel,
service of all other process in the suit, except garnishment
process, but including supplemental petitions, or original and
supplemental petitions of said other parties, such as intervenors or third opponents or others, may be accepted by, or service may be made upon, the attorney of record, or where there
is more than one attorney, upon any one attorney of record,
for the plaintiffs or defendants, and the right so to serve shall
remain until the attorney shall have formally withdrawn from
the case, under order of court; this rule shall also apply to the
attorney for plaintiff, intervenors or third opponents or other
parties; and the provisions of this Act being hereby made ap189. Fidelity Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
152 So. 692 (La. App. 1934).
190. 182 La. 252, 161 So. 601 (1935).
191. Id. at 257, 161 So. at 602 (1935),
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plicable for use in any cause or causes now pending or not finally determined in the Courts of this State." (Italics supplied)
This necessarily supersedes Section 1 (16) of the Service of
Process Act of 1918, and overrules the decision in the Adams case.
It must be noted that as now worded, the act is broad enough to
include any and all parties who may be made parties to a civil
suit at any time before its final adjudication, and that it is made
to apply to suits now pending. This legislation is very desirable
since its effect is to facilitate service and thereby to speed up the
normal course of litigation.
Banks and Banking. Formerly no person could be eligible as
a director of any state bank or banking association unless he were
a stockholder owning in his right at least $100.00 worth of stock.'92
This requirement has been raised by the 1938 statute which provides that directors of banks having a paid up capital of $100,000.00 or less, must own at least $500.00 worth of stock, and in
banks having a paid up capital of more than $100,000.00, directors
must own at least $1,000.00 worth of stock. 19
Another statute provides that banking institutions, organized
under the laws of Louisiana and having a capital of $100,000.00 or
more, may open branches "in parishes where there are no banks,
savings banks and trust companies," but no banking institution
may open more than one branch in any one parish outside of its
domicile. 94 A certificate of authority from the State Bank Com195
missioner is required for the establishment of such branches.
This statute supplements the present provisions regarding branch
banks, but establishes a general rule to cover such cases instead of
resorting to special legislation for particular parishes as did a previous statute.19 6
A change has also been made in the statute governing the
examination of state savings banks and trust companies. It was
formerly the duty of the State Bank Commissioner to make such
an inspection at least twice a year; 0 7 under the 1938 amendment
this is required only once a year." 8
192. La. Act 193 of 1910, § 1, as amended by La. Act 221 of 1916 and La.
Act 213 of 1920 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 611].
193. La. Act 193 of 1938.
194. La. Act 254 of 1938, §§ 1, 2.
195. La. Act 254 of 1938, § 4.
196. See La. Act 219 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1937) § 547.1]. For
general provisions, see La. Act 179 of 1902, as last amended by La. Act 229 of
1924 [Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 541-572].
197. La. Act 112 of 1920, § 3. [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 523].
198. La. Act 102 of 1938, amending La. Act 112 of 1920 § 3.
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The amount of reserves required of banking associations and
savings banks and trust companies was formerly fixed at twenty
per cent of the demand deposits, and in addition an amount equal
to four per cent of the demand deposits had to be kept in cash on
the premises at all times. 19 Two of the 1938 acts have eliminated
the necessity for maintaining the four per cent cash reserve, but
2 0
the twenty per cent reserve requirement is not affected.
With regard to the assessment of bank shares, an important
20 1
change has been made. According to the terms of a 1917 act,
no assessment was to be made against the capital stock, surplus or
undivided profits of banking companies whose capital stock was
represented by shares. Such shares were to be assessed against the
holders thereof "at actual value or the same percentage of actual
value as that fixed on other property for state and local assessment purposes," and it was the duty of the officers of such banks
to furnish to the assessor of the parish a complete list of all shareholders. Under the terms of the 1938 legislation the assessment is
to be made by the Louisiana Tax Commission instead of by the
parish assessor. Accordingly, the list of shareholders is to be furnished to the Tax Commission; and the mode of assessing shares is
replaced by a provision that. the value of such shares of stock shall
be fixed by the Tax Commission in accordance with definite instructions set forth in the act.20 2 Formerly the basis used in arriving at the value of the shares was the bank statement made to the
Comptroller of the Currency or to the State Bank Commissioner,
less the value of real estate owned by the bank, the value of preferred stock owned by the United States and the capital stock of
any corporation, all of which was owned by the bank. These deductions are likewise authorized in the 1938 Act, but the Commission is given a wide latitude in arriving at the value of the shares.
An additional or alternative method for the assessment of
bank shares is provided by Act 173 of 1938. When a bank operates branches in different municipalities wholly within the limits
of the parish of its domicile, its tax assessment for state and local
purposes may either be made at its domicile or be divided among
the various municipalities in proportion to the ratio that the de199. La. Act 179 of 1902 § 14 as amended by La. Act
Stats. (1932) § 554]; La. Act 45 of 1902, § 5 as amended by
[Dart's Stats. (1932) § 586].
200. La. Act 103 of 1938; La. Act 104 of 1938.
201. La. Act 14 of 1917 (E.S.) § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1932)
202. La. Act 172 of 1938, §§ 1, 2, amending La. Act
§§ 2, 4 [Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 685-687].

91 of 1918 [Dart's
La. Act 92 of 1918
§ 685].
14 of 1917 (E.S.)
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posits in such branches bear to the total deposits of the bank in
any one year. The application of this statute is discretionary with
2
the banks who are entitled to use it.03
By the terms of Act 338 of 1938 banks are authorized to invest
in the shares of any homestead or building and loan association
whose accounts are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. Such purchase or investment "shall not
exceed at any one time, Five Thousand Dollars in any one homestead and building and loan association." ' 4
Building and Loan Associations. A number of amendments to
the Louisiana Homestead and Building and Loan Statute, Act 140
of 1932, should be noted. Section 4 has been amended so as to allow the use of the name "savings and loan association", and to
prohibit the use of such name by any corporation not organized
20 5
under the Homestead Act.
Two separate amendments to Section 15 regarding geographical limitations were adopted. 20 6 Hitherto, homesteads organized in
Orleans parish could also operate in the parishes of St. Bernard
and Jefferson and homesteads organized in the latter parishes
could likewise operate in Orleans parish. By amendment the parish of St. Charles has been added to, this group so that building
and loan associations organized in Orleans parish can now operate
in the parish of St. Charles and vice-versa. The geographical limitation on the operations of homesteads organized in other parishes
remains unchanged except that those organized in the parish of
Iberia may make loans on property situated in St. Martin parish.
Section 28 of the Homestead Act formerly provided that the
gross earnings of the association should be determined "monthly,
quarterly, semi-annually, or annually, as may be specified in the
act of incorporation or in the by-laws" for the purpose of setting
aside three per cent of the net profits to meet contingent losses,
until the fund thus created reached five per cent of the outstanding loans. This has been changed to conform with the actual practice so that the gross earnings for the preceding six months' period are to be ascertained "on the last day of June and December
in each year." Section 28 has also been amended to make it clear
203. La. Act 173 of 1938, § 2.
204. La. Act 338 of 1938, § 1.
205. La. Act 337 of 1938, § 2 amending La. Act 140 of 1932 § 4 [Dart's
Stats. (1932) § 719].
206. La. Act 70 of 1938 and La. Act 337 of 1938, § 3. Both amend La. Act
140 of 1932, § 15 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 727]. The provisions of La. Act 70 of
1938 are, however, included in La. Act 337 of 1938.
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that the reserve account required by the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation shall be included as a part of the
reserve required under the Louisiana act, thereby avoiding the
necessity of maintaining dual reserve accounts.2 "'
Section 34 of the Homestead Act formerly provided that married women could own, transfer, pledge, subscribe for, borrow
upon and surrender shares in building and loan associations without the husband's authorization, and that said shares were not to
be regarded as forming part of the marital community or of the
husband's estate. As amended Section 34 simply reads:
"Any married woman may subscribe for, own, hold, withdraw, transfer, give, pledge, borrow upon and surrender shares
in such associations as a femme sole."
The effect of the amendment would seem to be that it subjects
such shares to the rules of community property where such rules
208
are otherwise applicable.
The qualifications for directors have been altered by eliminating the former provision of Section 37 of the Homestead Act which
made eligible "any executor, administrator, tutor or trustee, holding shares of an association of the value of at least one thousand
dollars in his or her representative capacity." A person claiming
eligibility as a director must now own shares "in his own right."
Another change in this Section provides that the unqualified person "shall be removed from the office of director by the Board of
Directors." A new paragraph has been added to Section 37 to provide that no person shall be permitted to serve -simultaneously as
a director of more than one homestead, but this provision does not
affect those who are presently holding more than one such direc209
torship.
By amendment to Section 39 of the Homestead Act, the
amount of the bond required of officers and employees is now
definitely fixed by statute instead of being fixed as previously by
the board of directors with the approval of the State Bank Commissioner. The amount of the bond required varies according to
210
the amount of the assets of the association.
207. La.
Stats. (1932)
208. La.
Stats. (1932)
209. La.
Stats. (1932)
210. La.
Stats. (1932)

Act 337
§ 740].
Act 337
§ 744.2].
Act 337
§ 744.5].
Act 337
§ 744.7].

of 1938, § 4 amending La. Act 140 of 1932, § 28 [Dart's
of 1938, § 5 amending La. Act 140 of 1932, § 34 [Dart's
of 1938, § 6 amending La. Act 140 of 1932, § 37 [Dart's
of 1938, § 7 amending La. Act 140 of 1932, § 39 [Dart's
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An important change was effected in Section 50 of the Homestead Act regarding the priority of the homestead lien over taxes.
Heretofore the Act contained no provision relative to priority over
taxes. It is now provided ". . . and said vendor's privilege and
mortgage in favor of building and loan associations shall also enjoy priority over all liens, privileges, and encumbrances for taxes
of whatever nature and character whatsoever, state, parochial or
municipal, unless recorded prior to the recordation of said vendor's lien and mortgage, except ad valorem taxes on real property,
' 21
corporation franchise taxes and assessments for paving. 1
Instead of a detailed report being furnished twice a year to
the State Bank Commissioner, such a full report is to be submitted
once a year within thirty days from the last of December, and a
condensed report within thirty days from the last of June. Similarly the examinations each year by the State Bank Commissioner
21 2
have been reduced from two to one.
The merger and consolidation of homesteads may now be
made with the consent and approval of the State Bank Commissioner-by a written agreement between the respective Boards
of Directors ratified by a two-thirds vote of the shareholders. 218
The procedure is copied largely from the Business Corporation
214
Act.
Another statute to be noted is Act 339 of 1938 which authorizes the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation to serve
as liquidator of homesteads and building and loan associations,
whose accounts it insures, when any such association is taken over
for liquidation by the State Bank Commissioner as Supervisor of
Homestead and Building and Loan Associations. By the terms of
Act 338 of 1938, homesteads are authorized, under certain limitations, to invest in the shares of other insured homesteads.
City Courts. The jurisdiction of the city courts in the several
parishes of the State, with the exception of the parish of Orleans,
has been fixed by a general statute drafted to conform with the
1936 constitutional amendment on the subject. 21 5 The principal
211. La. Act 337 of 1938, § 8 amending La. Act 140 of 1932, § 50 [Dart's
Stats. (1932) § 744.18].
212. La. Act 337 of 1938, §§ 9, 10, amending La. Act 140 of 1932, §§64, 65
[Dart's Stats. (1932) H9 744.32-744.33].
213. La. Act 169 of 1938.
214. La. Act 250 of 1928, §§ 47, 48, 49, 50, 51 [Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 11271131].
215. La. Act 63 of 1936, adopted as a constitutional amendment November
3, 1936. Prior to the 1936 amendment, the Legislature was empowered to confer civil jurisdiction on city courts, in parishes of 10,000 or more inhabitants,
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change effected is that, in parishes of more than 20,000 inhabitants,
jurisdiction of the city courts is concurrent with that of the district courts in all cases where the amount does not exceed $500.00
(exclusive of interest and attorney's fees) .216 It is further provided, in accordance with the constitutional provision, that all appeals from city courts in cases involving more than $100.00 shall
be returnable to the Court of Appeal, and where the amount is
2 17
$100.00 or less the appeal is to the District Court.

Specific legislation was also enacted in 1938 to empower the
judges of the First City Court of the City of New Orleans to make
218
all the necessary rules to govern their court.

Criminal Law and Procedure. A statute for mutual supervision of out-of-state parolees was adopted by the Legislature as Act
168 of 1938. This authorizes the Governor of Louisiana to enter
into compacts with any other state of the Union for the purpose
of permitting prisoners who have been paroled or placed on probation in one state, to enter and live in the other while on parole.
The receiving state is to assume all the duties of supervision, but
is to grant the requisite permission for admission only after investigation of the home and prospective employment of the parolee. If it becomes necessary for the sending state to recall the
parolee, all the legal requirements of extradition are waived in
the compact.

219

The Code of Criminal Procedure has been amended as follows:
(1) Article 39 formerly imposed the duty on any person,
including physicians and undertakers, having first knowledge of
the death of a person who died violently, accidentally, as a result
of abortion or under suspicious circumstances, to give notice of
such death to the coroner. The article also made it unlawful to
concurrent with the jurisdiction of the district court, in cases in which the
amount involved did not exceed $300.00. The 1936 constitutional amendment
provided that where the population of the city and wards of the parish is

20,000 or more, the Legislature may confer civil jurisdiction on city courts
concurrent with that of the district court where the amount does not exceed
$500.00. The constitutional amendment was designed primarily for the City
Court of the City of Shreveport and a special statute was passed at the same

session relative to that City Court, La. Act 46 of 1936. La. Act 316 of 1938 is
statewide in application, excepting the Parish of Orleans.

216. See La. Act 316 of 1938, § 1.
217. See La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 51 as amended by La. Act 63 of 1936.
The 1938 Act has no application to the City Court of New Orleans.
218. La. Act 176 of 1938.

219. Among the other states which have adopted similar statutes are:
Arkansas (Act 172 of 1937); Illinois (Smith-Hurd Stats. (1936) c. 38 § 817);

Indiana (Laws, 1935, c. 289 p. 1441); and Minnesota (Laws, 1935, c. 257, p. 465).
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remove the body without obtaining the coroner's permission. As
amended by Act 366 of 1938, the article now requires that the district attorney shall be notified also, and makes it unlawful to destroy any clothing or other evidence or to remove the body without the permission of both the coroner and the district attorney.
(2) Articles 150 and 151 have been changed so as to reduce
by one-half the number of witnesses who may be summoned in
misdemeanor cases at the expense of the parish. Under Article
150 as amended, each side is allowed to summon, at the expense
of the parish, 12 witnesses in felony cases and six in misdemeanor
cases. Since Article 151 operates as a limitation on Article 150,
the former had to be amended so as to conform with the latter.220
(3) Article 354, as amended by Act 365 of 1938, now provides that each defendant, in cases in which there are more than
one, shall be entitled to the number of peremptory charges therein provided,221 and the State is given the same number of chal''
lenges "for each defendant. 222
Act 412 of 1938 provides that capital punishment shall be the
penalty for kidnaping instead of the previous penalty of 20 years
22 3
at hard labor.
Debt Moratorium. By Act 126 of 1938 the provisions of the
debt moratorium statute are extended until twelve o'clock noon
of the twentieth day after the adjournment of the Legislature in
1940. This is a re-enactment of the 1936 statute suspending all
laws relative to the enforcement of debts, and it continues the
duties of the debt moratorium commissioner. 24 The 1938 Act affects only those debts made, contracted or existing prior to July
1, 1936, but it does not apply to such debts which are renewed or
extended for a period ending after twenty days from the adjourn.
ment of the 1940 regular session of the Legislature.221
Evidence-Certified records of Charity Hospitals of the State
to be received in evidence. In 1912 the Legislature of Louisiana
220. La. Act 367 of 1938.
221. This was already the rule by interpretation. State v. Caron, 118 La.
349, 42 So. 960 (1907). But this article has been amended to state "each defendant" instead of "the defendant."
222. In the light of State v. Elmore, 179 La. 1057, 155 So. 896 (1934), the
article as amended is constitutional.
223. La. Act 221 of 1932, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1937) Art. 1301.1].
224. La. Act 2 of 1936 was itself a reenactment of La. Act 2 of 1934 (2 E.S.)
which in turn had replaced La. Act 159 of 1934.
225. La. Act 126 of 1938, § 9.
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enacted a statute commonly known as the "Public Records Act," 226
which declared that all records, writings, accounts, maps, drawings, memoranda, etc., and all copies thereof, being in use or prepared for use in any business or function conducted by and under
the authority of the Legislature, should be public records and
available for public use (save for certain exceptions therein enumerated and not pertinent to the present inquiry). Hospital charts
and records were specifically exempted from the provisions of
the Public Records Act by statute, 227 except when the condition
or illness of the patient was due to accident, poisoning, or negligence resulting in injury. In construing these statutes, the courts
have uniformly held that charts or records of the Charity Hospitals of the State were hearsay and as such inadmissible in evidence,2 2 even when their introduction was sought for the purpose

229
of showing the extent of a plaintiff's personal injuries.
It was perhaps the rulings in these cases that prompted the
Legislature to adopt Act 170 of 1932 which provided that duly certified copies of the records of Charity Hospitals should be admissible in evidence under an order of court. The effect of this was
to repeal (by necessary implication) Act 267 of 1928, but under
Act 170 of 1932 the probative value of these records was not affected in the least, because the jurisprudence remained constant
to the effect that they constituted hearsay evidence for all purposes unless they could
be properly identified by the persons who
23 0

made the originals.

Such decisions were undesirable and conducive to unjust results in many cases. Therefore, to remedy the situation the Legis226. La. Act 242 of 1912, as amended by La. Act 185 of 1916 and La. Act
255 of 1920 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 7825-7842].
227. La. Act 267 of 1928 [Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 7843-7845].
228. Dolan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 La. App. 276, 123 So. 379
(1929); Charity Hospital v. Fornea, 15 La. App. 638, 132 So. 663 (1931); Ayo v.
Holzenthal, 19 La. App. 561, 141 So. 92 (1932); Williams v. Locicero, 142 So.
856 (La. App. 1932); Gaines v. Acme Industrial Life Ins. Soc., 155 So. 276 (La.
App. 1934); Lado v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 182 La. 726, 162 So. 579 (1935),
affirming 158 So. 872 (La. App. 1935).
229. Ayo v. Holzenthal, 19 La. App. 561, 141 So. 92 (1932); Williams v.

Locicero, 142 So. 856 (La. App. 1932). In the Ayo case, the records were admitted without objection and the court held: "While it is true that Charity
Hospital records constitute hearsay evidence, we do not feel that they should

be excluded by the Appellate Court when they have been admitted without
objection in the court below."
230. Gaines v. Acme Industrial Life Ins. Soc., 155 So. 276 (La. App. 1934);
Lado v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 182 La. 726, 162 So. 579 (1935). In the Lado
case the court of appeal said: ". . . But here we have the pathologist who performed the autopsy on deceased and the records of the hospital prepared by
him... Such evidence Is certainly not hearsay and is unobjectionable on that
ground." (158 So. at 874)
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lature promptly passed Act 108 of 1936, again asserting that these
records be admissible in evidence, but only as prima facie proof
and subject to rebuttal by the testimony of the person who made
the original. However, such a strict observance of the statute was
necessary that in the recent case of Sampson v. Life & Casualty
Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 28 1 the records of the New Orleans Charity
Hospital were held inadmissible in evidence because they were
certified by the assistant superintendent and not by the superintendent of the hospital or the secretary-treasurer of the board of
administrators as required by the statute.
In a further attempt to accomplish its objective, the Legislature passed Act 90 of 1938 which extends the valid certification of
copies of records to either the director, assistant director, superintendent or secretary-treasurer of the board of administrators of
the hospital in question. In view of the holding in the Sampson
case, this statute must likewise be strictly construed.
Gambling-Abatement of Nuisance. Act 49 of 1938 has the
effect of making it much more difficult to abate the nuisances created by gambling houses. Under the earlier provision, any taxpayer, whether a citizen or a non-resident had the right to file
suit to abate such nuisances.2 32 This right cannot be exercised now
unless the action is brought by twenty-five real estate taxpayers
who have resided and voted continuously for five years in the locality of the alleged nuisance. 28 Formerly the plaintiff in abatement proceedings was not required to furnish bond, 284 but he is
now required to do so (the amount to be determined by the court)
in order to indemnify the defendant if the injunction is set aside.2 5
Insurance. A number of changes in the laws regulating insurance should be noted. The former provision that rates fixed by
the Louisiana Casualty and Surety Rating Commission were mandatory is now modified by a 1938 amendment which provides
"that any such insurer shall have the right to apply for a hearing
before the Commission on any rates so fixed, which shall be
granted by the Commission and held after fifteen days' notice to
2 6
all parties interested.
231. 175 So. 148 (La. App. 1937).
232. La. Act 192 of 1920, § 3 [Dart's Criminal Stats. (1932) Art. 1026].
233. Under the amended language of La. Act 49 of 1938 it is doubtful

whether an artificial person could maintain the action.
234. La. Act 192 of 1920, § 10 [Dart's Criminal Stats. (1932) Art. 1033].
'235. See La. Act 49 of 1938, amending La. Act 192 of 1920, § 10 [Dart's
Criminal Stats. (1932) Art. 1033].
236. La. Act 122 of 1938, amending La. Act 44 of 1936, § 3 [Dart's Stats.
(Supp. 1937) § 4277.3].
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Formerly, it was provided that casualty, surety, fidelity, guaranty or bonding companies could apply for a uniform reduction
of rates on risks of a particular class, and that such application
"shall be approved" if the schedule is fair and compensatory; the
present change to "may be approved" has the effect of allowing
the Commission a wider range of discretion. 2 7 A change has also
been made so as to limit the assessment against insurers for the
Commission to one per cent of the
operating expenses of the
238
gross premiums received.
Act 136 of 1938 provides for the establishment, incorporation
and regulation of "service insurance companies." For the purposes
of the act, "service insurance" is defined as an agreement whereby
the insurer agrees to pay funeral expenses or hospitalization fees
from funds obtained through membership admission fees, dues, or
special assessments to be collected from the members of the company or association. 23 9 Regulations affecting foreign companies or
associations doing business as "service insurers" in Louisiana have
also been incorporated into this statute.
Under the provisions of a 1932 statute, foreign insurance companies (with certain exceptions) were required to furnish acceptable bond for $20,000 in favor of the State of Louisiana, conditioned
upon the prompt payment of all claims arising out of policies
issued by such companies; the 1938 amendment makes the provisions of this act also applicable to domestic companies.240 Legal
reserve life insurance companies are exempted from this requirement if a deposit of $100,000 is maintained in Louisiana or in another state.
A 1936 statute provided that where no medical examination
was required and the insurer's agent knew or had the opportunity
to know the condition of the insured's health, it was presumed
that the insurer had waived its rights to claim a forfeiture of the
policy for failure of insured to make a full disclosure of his condition. By Act 160 of 1934, wilful misrepresentation or fraud on
the part of the assured could be established as a defense to his
claim. The 1938 amendment incorporates the provisions of this
latter statute into the 1936 Act, so as to provide that industrial
237. La. Act 122 of 1938, amending La. Act 44 of 1936 § 5 [Dart's Stats.
(Supp. 1937) § 4277.5].
238. La. Act 122 of 1938, amending Act 44 of 1936 § 10 [Dart's Stats. (Supp.
1937) § 4277.10].
239. La. Act 136 of 1938, § 7.
240. La. Act 139 of 1938, amending La. Act 158 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1932)
§ 4254].
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life insurance policies shall not be deemed void by any misrepresentation in the application, unless such misrepresentation is wilful and conceals facts as to the ill health of the assured at the
time of the application; and fraud shall always be a defense to the
insurer.241 It is further provided by the same amendment that industrial life insurance policies are incontestable after one year,
except for non-payment of premium.
A statute was enacted at the 1938 session requiring insurance
companies (with some exceptions) to have every contract countersigned in Louisiana by a duly authorized "resident agent" who
must be a bona fide resident of Louisiana, and who shall receive
the commissions thereon.242 Policies not so countersigned shall
not be valid in Louisiana. The evident purpose of the statute is to
prevent companies from insuring risks located in Louisiana and
allowing non-resident agents to earn the commissions therefrom.
A similar purpose is sought to be accomplished in another statute,
Act 353 of 1938, which provides that companies doing business as
casualty, surety, and guaranty insurers, shall not pay commissions
on account of policies written on risks located in Louisiana, to
persons who are not duly licensed as insurance agents in this
State (under penalty of revocation of the license of the company
or agent). Both of these statutes, in their application, present
constitutional questions too involved for discussion within the
248
limits of this paper.
Judicial Advertisements. In the Parish of Orleans, judicial
advertisements formerly had to be published in a daily newspaper
selected either by the defendant, the party charged with the conduct of the proceedings, or by the plaintiff in the suit. And if
these parties neglected or failed to select the newspaper within
the time stipulated, then the sheriff, clerk or constable, could
make the selection. 244 As amended in 1938, this has been changed
241. La. Act 140 of 1938, amending La. Act 144 of 1936 [Dart's Stats.
(Supp. 1937) § 4134.4]. In Sharper v. Security Mutual Benefit Assn., 177 So. 461

(La. App. 1937) the court ignored the provisions of Act 160 of 1934 and held
that an intentional false representation was no defense to the insurer. The
rule of this case is overturned by the 1938 amendment. On the question of
what is a "wilful" misrepresentation, see Strudwick Funeral Home, Inc. v.
Nat'l Life & Accident Ins. Co., Inc., 176 So. 891 (La. App. 1937).
242. La. Act 348 of 1938.
243. Can a State prevent one of its citizens from securing a policy of

insurance by contract entered into outside of the State? Cf. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 17 S.Ct. 427, 41 L.Ed. 832 (1897); Hooper v. California, 155
U.S. 648, 15 S.Ct. 207, 39 L.Ed. 297 (1895); Bothwell v. Buckbee Mears Co., 275
U.S. 274, 48 S.Ct. 124, 72 L.Ed. 277 (1927).
244. La. Act 49 of 1877 § 15 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 4439].
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so that the selection of the newspaper shall be made by the
sheriff, constable, clerk or other officer who is charged with the
abolishing the right of the parties to
conduct of the sale, thereby
245
newspaper.
select the
Labor. Two statutes of outstanding importance in labor regulation authorize the establishment of minimum wages for women
24
and girl workers and regulate the hours of labor of women. 6
Act 362 of 1938 prohibits the employment of women and girls in
any industry or occupation under conditions of labor which are
detrimental to their health and morals or at wages which are
not adequate for their maintenance. A Minimum Wage Division
is established in the Department of Labor, which is instructed
to set up a standard of wages and conditions of labor, and for
this purpose is empowered to investigate conditions in all industries and to make recommendations to the Department of Labor
as to the reasonableness of wages paid. Violations of the act are
punishable by fine and/or imprisonment. All questions of fact
are to be determined by the Commissioner of Labor from whose
decision no appeal is allowed, but questions of law are appealable
to the District Courts. 24 7 It is also provided that all laws relative
to the regulation of the hours of labor of women and girls are
not repealed, such statutes being supplementary to the minimum
248
wage law.
Act 363 of 1938, regulating the hours of labor for women employed "in any manufacturing, mechanical or mercantile establishment, laundry, hotel or restaurant, or telegraph or telephone
establishment or office, or by any express or transportation
company in the State of Louisiana," provides that they should
work no more than six days a week and no more than eight hours
a day nor more than 48 hours in any week. The statute has no
application in municipalities of less than 6,000 inhabitants.
Legal Holidays. Three new statutes were enacted all amend249
ing the same section of the 1932 Act designating legal holidays.
245. La. Act 75 of 1938, amending La. Act 49 of 1877, § 15.
246. This type of legislation is constitutional, see West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703, 108 A.L.R. 1330 (1937).
247. La. Act 362 of 1938, § 16.
248. Statutes regulating the employment of women and children were
enacted in Louisiana as early as 1908. See La. Act 301 of 1908 [Dart's Stats.
(1932) §§ 4319 et seq.]. Insofar as they do not conflict with the 1938 Acts, the
earlier statutes remain in effect.
249. La. Act 165 of 1932, as amended by La. Act 289 of 1936 [Dart's Stats.
(Supp. 1937) § 3795].

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I

Act 84 of 1938 adds January 19, the birthday of Robert E. Lee, as a
legal holiday. Act 91 of 1938 adds May 30, National Memorial Day,
and August 30, the birthday of the late Senator Huey P. Long
(a legal holiday already recognized by constitutional provision25 ),
but does not include January 19. Act 307 of 1938 makes no
mention of January 19, May 30, or August 30, but merely adds
East Baton Rouge to the parishes in which Mardi Gras is a legal
holiday. This raises a question regarding the effect of several
acts passed at the same legislative session, or more specifically, can
January 19 and May 30 be considered as legal holidays? It is
submitted that all three statutes should be given effect in accordance with the "intention" of the Legislature in each one because
251
there is not necessarily any conflict between them.
Liens on Vessels. Act 381 of 1938 creates a first lien and
privilege against a vessel causing loss or damage to persons or
property within the territorial limits of Louisiana; and it provides
for an action in rem against the vessel in a court of "competent
jurisdiction," either at the place where the injury happened or
wherever the vessel may be found. It is clear that this act can
only have application in cases where the tort committed by the
250. La. Const. of 1921 Art. XIX, § 22, adopted as a constitutional amendment Nov. 3, 1936.
251. A written opinion has been rendered by one of the special assistants
to the Attorney General to the effect that since La. Act 307 of 1938 was passed
and signed at a later date than La. Acts 84 and 91 of 1938, the provisions of
this last approved Act 307 should govern and that neither January 19 nor
May 30 are legal holidays. (Letter of Aug. 27, 1938 to attorneys in Alexandria,
La.) But this opinion overlooks (1) the constitutional provision that all laws
go into effect at the same time at 12 o'clock noon on the twentieth day after
the adjournment of the Legislature, and (2) that precedence should not be
given to either statute if they can all be given effect without conflict. In
Middleton v. Police Jury of the Parish of Jefferson, 169 La. 458, 462, 125 So.
447, 449 (1929), the court said: "We are not seriously impressed, however, with
the contention that the second proposed amendment repealed by implication
or destroyed the first proposed amendment because of the fact that it was the
latest expression of the legislative will. This would not be true, even if the two
resolutions were regarded as matters of legislation. Under section 27, article 3
of the Constitution of 1921, all laws take effect at 12 o'clock noon on the twentieth day after the adjournment of the Legislature. There can be, therefore,
no legal priority of one law over another passed at the same session. But, be
that as it may, the doctrine of 'last expression of legislative will' does not apply to constitutional amendments." (Italics supplied). Contra: McVay v. N.O.
Pub. Service, 148 So. 67 (La. App. 1933). See also St. Martin v. City of New
Orleans, 14 La. Ann. 113 (1859); Kinney v. Edenborn, 151 La. 216, 91 So. 712
(1922); State ex rel Pallet v. Board of Parole of Louisiana, 151 La. 720, 92 So.
312 (1922).
There are a number of other instances in which more than one act on the
same subject matter was passed in 1938. For example: Acts 177 and 248 (Compensation of Tax Assessor). See also Acts 310 and 372 (Regulating Sale of
Livestock). This duplication was reported by the Legislative Bureau but the
Legislature In its haste enacted the duplications despite the report.
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vessel is not maritime, for it is well settled that where a cause
of action is cognizable in admirality and the suit is in rem the
admirality courts have exclusive jurisdiction; consequently a state
statute authorizing such a proceeding in a state court will be considered as an invasion of the admirality jurisdiction.2 52 A state
statute may, however, create a lien and provide an action in rem
for its enforcement in cases which do not fall within admirality
jurisdiction-for example, where a vessel negligently runs into a
land structure. Since the damage done to the structure would
not be the result of a maritime tort a court of admirality would
have no jurisdiction, and the state statute would be good. 22 Act
381 of 1938 must therefore be interpreted and applied in the light
of the relevant principles governing admirality jurisdiction.
Notaries. Act 110 of 1938 provides that neither recorders,
sheriffs, notaries, nor other persons authorized to convey property
by public act, shall pass or execute any act of sale unless all taxes
due on the property are paid as shown by a receipt or certificate
from the person in charge of the tax collection. This certificate
is to be annexed to the act of sale and is conclusive proof that
2 54
the taxes therein certified have been paid.
Act 116 of 1938 refers to cities having over 300,000 inhabitants
and contains similar provisions, but it also applies to the acknowledgment of an act under private signature; it further requires the
certificate to cover all charges for paving and other local improvements. The penalty provided in both of these statutes is directed
against the notary (or other officer) and does not cause the nullity
of the sale.
In the parish of Orleans the duty is imposed on notaries to
file a copy of each act of sale (with accompanying sketches and
blue prints) with the Board of Assessors within ten days from
the date of the sale or transfer. 25 5 The Custodian of Notarial
Records in Orleans Parish has been subjected to additional qualifications and duties, one of the most important of which requires
him to file a rule on all notaries at least once a year to test the
252. Knapp Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 20 S.Ct. 824, 44 L.Ed.

921 (1900).
253. Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191, 32 S.Ct. 42, 56 L.Ed. 159, (1911).

254. Act 110 of 1938 expressly repeals La. Act 348 of 1936 [Dart's Stats.
(Supp. 1937) § 63051 which in turn had repealed La. Act 170 of 1898, §§ 74, 75
[Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 8449, 8450]. The present Act 110 of 1938 re-enacts the

relevant provisions of the 1898 statute except that acknowledgment of acts
under private signature Is not included.
255. La. Act 73 of 1938.
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sureties on their bonds. 2 51 If the bond is found to be insufficient

and the notary fails to furnish new security, his commission is to
be forfeited.
Procedure. Procedure for the recovery of illegal taxes paid.
The Constitution of 1921 instructs the Legislature to provide
"against the issuance of process to restrain the collection of any
tax, and for a complete and adequate remedy for the prompt
recovery by every taxpayer of any illegal tax paid by him."s5
A 1934 statute was designed to carry this provision into effect
but it is doubtful whether the statute provided an "adequate
remedy at law" for the recovery of illegal taxes. 258 Act 330 of
1938 amended and re-enacted the 1934 statute so as to eliminate
all the possible objections, and Louisiana now furnishes an adequate remedy at law for the recovery of illegal or unconstitutional
taxes. The procedure is relatively simple and may be summarized
as follows: the aggrieved taxpayer may pay the tax under protest
and give notice of intention to file suit for its recovery; the
amount of the tax is to be segregated and held by the collector for
thirty days, during which time the taxpayer's suit is to be filed.
If this suit is actually filed the money must continue to be held
by the collector and if the final determination is in favor of the
taxpayer, it is to be returned to him with interest (at the rate of
two per cent per annum). This statute will doubtless have the
effect of preventing injunctions against the collection of taxes
in both the state and federal courts.
Suits in forma pauperis. Prior to 1938 it was questionable
whether a person litigating in forma pauperis could require the
free services of court officers outside of the parish wherein the
proceedings were being conducted or when the proceedings were
being had out of court because the earlier statute was silent in
this respect. 259 Act 421 of 1938 now provides specifically that

paupers shall be entitled, free of cost, to all the services required
of court officers in any parish where the legal proceedings are
being had "regardless of the venue or the parish of origin of the
said proceedings and whether the same are being conducted in
256. La. Act 203 of 1938. The Custodian must be a lawyer and a notary.
257. La. Const. of 1921 Art. X, § 18.
258. See La. Act 16 of 1934 (2 E.S.) as amended by La. Act 23 of 1935
(2 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1937) §§ 8444.1-8444.4]. This question was raised
in Union Sulphur Co. v. Reid, 17 F. Supp. 27 (W.D.La. 1936) but was not decided because jurisdiction of the federal court could not be divested by the
subsequent passage of the statute.
259. See La. Act 156 of 1912, § 1, as amended by La. Act 260 of 1918 [Dart's
Stats. (1932) § 1400].

1938]

LOUISIANA LEGISLATION OF 1938

or out of court or before a judge or before a notary or any other
person."
Share-croppers,Ejectment. Act 298 of 1938 provides a method
of procedure for the ejectment of share-croppers, half hands or
day laborers. In general this is similar to the existing procedure
for the ejectment of other tenants. 60
Sovereignty of Louisiana. Act 55 of 1938 which fixes the territorial limits of the State of Louisiana 27 miles out into the Gulf
of Mexico is of more than passing interest. When oil was recently
discovered off the coast of California within the three-mile limit,
a bill was introduced in the Senate of the United States to declare
that lands within the territorial waters of the United States were
the property of the Federal Government and that the oil therein
contained should be converted into a national oil reserve. At that
particular time no minerals had actually been discovered under
the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, but the State had already leased
a considerable portion of the bed of the Gulf within the three-mile
limit for oil exploration purposes. As a result of an opposition
brief prepared by the Attorney General of Louisiana, a substitute
bill was proposed which merely authorized the Attorney General
of the United States to bring suit on behalf of the Federal Government asserting title to the sea bed within the limits of the
United States. Act 55 of 1938 is a legislative declaration in support
of the position of the Attorney General of Louisiana that the
title to these lands is in the State. According to principles of
international law, the three mile limit was originally fixed arbitrarily because it was the distance a cannon shot could be projected from shore. On similar principles this statute now declares
that the State of Louisiana is justified in establishing its seaward
boundary twenty-seven miles out from shore. The avowed purpose of the act is to refute the proposed congressional legislation
and to preserve for the State of Louisiana a large part of the
2 1
very valuable bed of the Gulf of Mexico. '
Trusts. In 1920 the introduction of limited trusts in Louisiana
increased the field of activity of the trust departments of banks
throughout the State. That statute, however, was inadequate in
many respects and failed to adapt properly the concept of trusts
260. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 2155, as amended by La. Act 55 of 1926 and
La. Act 200 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1937) § 6597].
261. La. Act 55 of 1938 has created nation wide interest and the support
of a number of states is already being given to the principles which it embodies.
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to Louisiana law. 26 2 Following the repeal of the limited trusts

act in 1935, efforts were made by the Louisiana Bankers Association to secure the passage of a statute which would embody the
best contemporary thought in the law of trusts and would also
fit in with the Louisiana legal system. Such a statute was drawn
up and it was adopted as Act 81 of the regular session of 1938.
This new Louisiana Trust Act, while sanctioning trusts, restricts
their operation to conform with state constitutional requirements
and to adapt it to present Louisiana law. The 1938 Trust Act is
primarily based upon the Restatement of the Law of Trusts, the
provisions of which have been kept as nearly intact as possible.
The Louisiana statute also embodies provisions taken from the
Uniform Principal and Income Act, the proposed Uniform Trusts
Act, and the proposed Spendthrift Trusts Act. The result is a
comprehensive piece of legislation which should facilitate the
development of trusts in Louisiana.
262. For a general discussion on this point see: Nabors, Proposals for
Amendment of the Louisiana Trust Act and the Louisiana Life Insurance
Exemption Statute (1934) 8 Tulane L. Rev. 522.

